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THESIS 




THE 


ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR POWER I 
IN THE ANALYSIS OF 


SSUE 


CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 




by 






Ted A. Lloyd, Jr. 






December 1978 




Thesis 


Advisor Lt. Col. D. P. 


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4. TITLE (and Subtltla) 

The Role of the Nuclear Power Issue in the 
Analysis of Contemporary International 
Relations 


5. TYPE OF REPORT a PERIOO COVERED 

Master's Thesis; 
December 1978 


6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 


7. AUTHOR^ 

Ted Allen Lloyd, Jr. 


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Naval Postgraduate School 
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December 1978 


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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 


19. KEY WOROS (Continue on rararaa »/<*• li nmctmamry and identity by block numbor) 

Nuclear power, nuclear industry and commerce, political and 
economic analysis, France, arms transfer, reprocessing, re- 
enrichment, uranium 


20. ABSTRACT (Contlnua an rttfWN »idm It nocotamrr and Idanttty by block mambor) 

Political analysis must keep pace with rapidly changing, ever 
more complex international relations. This thesis suggests that 
a systematic study of the nuclear energy issue is one logical 
choice for comprehensive international political analysis. 
Nuclear power policies and debates are examined for their ability 
to reflect current international trends of conflict and coopera- 
tion. Nuclear-related events trigger responses over a wide range 
of issues, permitting an analyst to observe the various courses 



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f u C vj wi T V C L*»l>'CtTiQM O* This g»Otrw».«« Q,,« l.iw< 



of national foreign policy in action. As one observes how 
nations interact in response to nuclear events, patterns are 
revealed, thus increasing one's knowledge of contemporary 
international relations. A paradigm is offered to systematize 
the analysis of nuclear-related events. A nuclear perspective 
is illustrated by examining worldwide trends on a global 
scale, European trends on a continental scale, and French 
foreign and domestic policies on a national scale. The 
nuclear power perspective serves as a valuable analytical 
tool with which to chart and interpret trends and events . 



DD l5^"? 3 U73 . 2 UMCLaaSlEIEfl 



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THE ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR POWER ISSUE IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

by 



Ted Allen Lloyd, Jr. 
Major, United States Air Force 
M.A. , University of Northern Colorado, 1976 
B.A., Gettysburg College, 1965 



Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 



MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

from the 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1978 



Dej$i of Information and Policy Sciences 



L I 



ABSTRACT 

Political analysis must keep pace with rapidly changing, 
ever more complex international relations. This thesis suggests 
that a systematic study of the nuclear energy issue is one logi- 
cal choice for comprehensive international political analysis. 
Nuclear power policies and debates are examined for their abil- 
ity to reflect current international trends of conflict and 
cooperation. Nuclear-related events trigger responses over a 
wide range of issues, permitting an analyst to observe the 
various courses of national foreign policy in action. As one 
observes how nations interact in response to nuclear events, 
patterns are revealed, thus increasing one's knowledge of con- 
temporary international relations. A paradigm is offered to 
systematize the analysis of nuclear-related events. A nuclear 
perspective is illustrated by examining worldwide trends on a 
global scale, European trends on a continental scale, and French 
foreign and domestic policies on a national scale. The nuclear 
power perspective serves as a valuable analytical tool with 
which to chart and interpret trends and events . 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 9 

I. NUCLEAR-ORIENTED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 14 

A. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 14 

B. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ■ 17 

1. New Language 13 

2. Political 19 

3. Military 19 

4. Economic 21 

C. INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS 2 3 

1. Suppliers Club 23 

2. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 24 

3. Nonproliferation Treaty 25 

4. Uranium Cartel 26 

D. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2 7 

1. A Paradigm is Needed 28 

2 . Five-Step Methodology 30 

II. THE CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 33 

A. THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY: A FORCE FOR THE 
FISSION OR FUSION OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS 33 

B. EVALUATING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY OPTION FOR WESTERN 
EUROPE 37 

1. The European Community 38 

2. France 41 

3. West Germany 45 

4. Sweden ■ 46 



5. Italy 47 

6. Spain 47 

7. Britain ■ 48 

8. The Netherlands 49 

C. WESTERN EUROPE COOPERATES TO GENERATE 49 

D. PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION AS EASTERN EUROPE 
CHOOSES THE NUCLEAR OPTION 57 

1. INTERATOMENERGO 58 

2. Romania 59 

3. Roots of Dissention 61 

4. Prospects for Change 63 

5. European Detente 67 

E. POLITICAL FORCES AFFECTING TRANS-EUROPEAN UNITY 6 8 

F. CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AS AN 
ANALYTICAL TOOL 72 

III. THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: NUCLEAR ENERGY AND FOREIGN 

POLICY 74 

A. THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO DWINDLING ARMS SALES IS 
NUCLEAR 8 

1. Reasons for Success 80 

2. Reasons for Decline 83 

3. French Nuclear Advantage 85 

4. Search for Markets 86 

B. ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES AND NUCLEAR EXPORT 

POLICIES 3 9 

1. Presenting the Evidence 39 

2. Historical Parallel Patterns 91 

3. Summarizing the Similarities 107 

4 . Conclusion ■ ■ 109 



C. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 111 

1. Definity French Foreign Policy 113 

2. The Role of Independent International Actor 114 

3. Guardian of Third World Stability 115 

4. Influencing the Reorganization of Europe 120 

5. Paris as a World Wide Metropolis 125 

D. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS 130 

1. Public Debate 131 

2. The Role of Nuclear Power Analysis 132 

3 . Conclusion 136 

IV. CONCLUSION 138 

APPENDIX - Countries That are Parties to the Nuclear Non- 

Proliferation Treaty 144 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 14 5 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 158 



LIST OF TABLES 



I. ESTIMATED NUCLEAR POWER GROWTH, WESTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES AND UNITED STATES 39 

II. URANIUM PRODUCTION CAPACITIES AND WORLD URANIUM 
REQUIREMENTS, 1974 THROUGH 1985 41 

III. FRENCH ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 19 74 AND 19 75 ACTUAL AND 

19 85 PROJECTIONS 4 2 

IV. SUPPLY OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT UNDER CONTRACT TO USERS 

IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 55 



INTRODUCTION 

This thesis will examine the systemic role of nuclear 
energy in contemporary international relations . This examina- 
tion will produce evidence to show that nuclear energy issues 
and debates have closely paralleled the major policy issues 
and debates that form the basis for both foreign and domestic 
policy. It is therefore possible to gain new insight into the 
field of international relations from an understanding of the 
role played by nuclear energy in the formulation of foreign 
policy. 

The question of nuclear energy has become a heated topic 
in both national and international politics. Although nuclear 
energy has been debated and analyzed from many perspectives 
over the past thirty years, certain aspects of nuclear power 
are often overlooked. Most of the oversights occur for one 
or more of the following reasons. Nuclear events tend to be 
studied as independent phenomena without regard to inherent, 
interdependent linkages. Secondly, questions of national 
security, and military applications of nuclear weaponry tend 
to acquire a disproportionate emphasis and consequently dom- 
inate much of the current analyses of nuclear power. Third, 
some aspects are overlooked simply because they are very 
subtle, very indirect responses to nuclear interactions. 
Subtlety does not obviate all significance however. Fourth, 
rapid technological and economic changes demand new per- 
spectives. Older models, systems, and paradigms may no longer 

9 



be applicable to recent developments. Therefore, this thesis 
will serve to acquaint the reader with the complex nature of 
nuclear energy as a contemporary political and economic issue 

Some narrowing of the thesis topic is necessary. While 
the military aspect is important, it has been thoroughly 
developed elsewhere, and will not be the primary subject of 
this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis will not attempt to 
prove or disprove the suitability of nuclear energy as a 
solution to the problem of energy scarcity. However, the 
post oil embargo search for secure, unencumbered energy has 
elevated nuclear power into the forefront of domestic and 
international politics. While some nations have taken a 
cautious approach to the spread of nuclear power, other 
nations have shown an aggressive commitment to a nuclear- 
powered future. Therefore, as nations modify their foreign 
policy in an attempt to achieve energy independence through 
nuclear development, they are forced to contend with the 
foreign policies of other nations who oppose the spread of 
nuclear power. Nuclear energy may constitute both the force 
behind, and the source of, politico-economic cooperation and 
conflict between nations. These nuclear-related interactions 
form the basis of new international relationships, and are 
the subject of this thesis. 

A broader conceptual framework is necessary to properly 
interpret recent political developments in international 
relations. This framework can be viewed from three levels 
of magnification: global, continental and national. The 



10 



world view, the global perspective, is presented in Chapter I, 
entitled "Nuclear-Oriented International Relations." The 
global view concerns the worldwide international infrastructure 
that has developed as a result of suppliers and consumers 
monopolizing uranium supplies and nuclear power consortiums. 
This global system exists as a legacy of the OPEC oil cartel 
and reflects the emergence of new patterns of international 
relations . 

Chapter II will narrow the focus to an examination of 
just the European continent. The European nations will be 
studied as they seek energy independence through nuclear 
power. This will be followed by an analysis of the political 
and economic relations between these European nations as they 
are affected by nuclear power. Finally, Chapter II will use 
the global perspective of nuclear relations to show how 
nuclear energy has influenced Eastern and Western European 
economic integration. 

Chapter III will complete the examination by narrowing 
the focus to one European country. France will be studied 
for its ability to use nuclear energy to enhance its foreign 
policy. Thus, the broad concepts of international nuclear 
relations will be presented from a national perspective. 

The author believes that by identifying the often dis- 
counted ability of national nuclear energy policies to 
influence international relations on a national, continental 
and global scale, a new perspective can be acquired. This 
nuclear perspective will become a valuable analytical tool 



11 



to chart and interpret trends and events during the next 
several decades of international relations. 

The following methodology will be used to identify nuclear 
energy related events and place them in the proper conceptual 
framework. Current issues require current sources for meaning- 
ful trend analysis. Nuclear energy, therefore, will be 
examined through a content analysis of recent books, periodicals, 
and newspaper accounts of the issues surrounding nuclear power. 
Personal interviews with American and French officials familiar 
with the nuclear power industry are a part of the research 
design. This thesis deals with events as they existed prior 
to summer 19 78. Any related events that occur after this 
period can be studied using the perspective and analytical 
technique identified in this thesis. 

It is recognized that much of what is asserted in this 
thesis about the role of nuclear energy in international 
relations could also be said about the other energy options. 
For example, mining and exploration for oil, coal, natural 
gas and uranium ore involve similar international trade 
agreements and economic reciprocity. There are also many 
similarities between solar, geo-thermal and nuclear generated 
power in the area of advanced energy research and development. 
However, while one may draw correlations between what is said 
about nuclear energy and the other energy options, it is the 
unique ability of nuclear energy to reflect the entire spectrum 
of energy issues. 

It is precisely this all-encompassing characteristic 
which makes an examination of the nuclear energy option 

12 



particularly significant to the political analyst. The 
issues which emerge from such an examination are significant 
because they reflect foreign policy questions which nations 
must resolve as they adapt to the impending energy crisis. 
Moreover, since nuclear energy policies exist in the main- 
stream of contemporary international relations, those 
policies can serve as political and economic indicators to 
chart the "drift," if not the substance, of political and 
economic trends . 



13 



I. NUCLEAR-ORIENTED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

A. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 

International relations are studied from many different 
perspectives and by several disciplined approaches. However, 
the impact of nuclear "power," military, political, or eco- 
nomic, has transformed international relations beyond the 
scope of standard rules for economic or political analysis. 
A new perspective may be necessary to understand the convo- 
luted nature of nuclear technology and its unconventional 
ability to influence foreign policy output. 

Proper perspective is the crux of accurate analyses. 
The old parable of the six blind men attempting to describe 
the true nature of the elephant provides an apt analogy. 
The elephant was actually the sum of its various character- 
istics -- viewed from a larger perspective. Caught up in the 
narrower interpretations, the blind men were unable to reach 
a consensus. The objective then, is to discover as many 
individual variables, or characteristics of the subject as 
possible, relating them to form a more comprehensive analysis 

Nuclear technology has introduced a number of new vari- 
ables acting on the political and economic structure of 
international relations. These variables appear in the news 
daily, in many forms. They can be seen as nuclear events - 
involving weapons, energy policies, resources, technology 



14 



transfers, trade or treaty agreements, and terrorism. Each 
event is related to the other, not so much by the word 
"nuclear" as by the disruptive effect which that event may 
have on the world community. 

For example, if a nation takes action to acquire a 
nuclear reactor and the reason is perceived to be that 
nation's desire to achieve energy self-sufficiency or escape 
from oil-dominated politics, then traditional analyses are 
often considered complete. However, traditional analyses 
ignore certain other aspects of this event, such as commerce, 
balance of payments, etc. The once clear distinction between 
commercial uses of nuclear technology and its military appli- 
cation is rapidly fading. This is especially true of the 
weapons grade plutonium byproduct of the recently introduced 
breeder reactors. Conventional balances of military power 
are upset by the potential ability of one state to resort to 
nuclear weapons in a regional crisis. As these examples 
illustrate, the real changes in international relations 
brought about by nuclear technology may be overlooked if 
analyses of nuclear events are confined to traditional 
analytical frameworks. 

The enormous power of nuclear energy to deter or compel 
often overshadows its more subtle power to interact in 
political and economic spheres. David Yergin writing in the 
Atlantic Monthly says that the interaction of nuclear energy 
with other factors is often overlooked because we still tend 
to think that all major nuclear developments will involve 



15 



advanced industrial states. However., Yergin points out that 
one can see the outline of new "atomic alliances" crisscrossing 
the world. For example, Argentinian scientists are at work in 
Iran's nuclear program, and Egyptian scientists are being 

trained at the nuclear facility that gave India its explosive 

[191 • 56 1 
device. J Therefore, established paradigms for the study 

of international nuclear relations must be modified to include 

the global implications of a nuclear-oriented event. 

Additionally, William Epstein, a nuclear advisor to the 

United Nations, has said that "the production of nuclear arms 

may not enhance a nation's security since its neighbors will 

look upon its intentions with suspicion and the nuclear 



powers will regard its achievement as a destabilizing 

:es 
,.[38:3] 



[ 38 • 3 1 
factor." ' He asserts that "regional arms races may break 



out with devastating effects on fragile economies 
David Baldwin, in his article entitled "America in an Inde- 
pendent World: Problems of United States Foreign Policy," 
adds additional factors which complicate the analysis of 
nuclear events. He claims that energy shortages, involve- 
ment of multinational corporations in the nuclear power 

industry, and the potential for domestic and international 

[131 
prestige will probably enhance proliferation. J In short, 

nuclear energy events can interact with other political and 
economic events to create new inputs to international 
foreign policy. 

This thesis presents the argument that the transforma- 
tion of international relations, by the evolution of nuclear 
power, has either been ignored, exaggerated to extremes, or 

16 



analyzed piecemeal. The following section will show the 
extent of change in political, military, and economic ele- 
ments of inter-"nuclear" relations. Next, section C will 
present evidence that a worldwide interactive network has 
developed as a response designed to deal realistically with 
the ancillary consequences of nuclear energy. Finally, a 
paradigm is suggested to enable foreign policy analysts to 
study nuclear-related events in a nomothetic rather than 
ideographic manner. Based on content analysis, the paradigm 
is put forth as a method of linking the independent variables - 
things nuclear - with the dependent variable - foreign policy 
output. 

B. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

The political, military and economic aspects of inter- 
national relations have all undergone subtle changes as 
nations have adapted patterns of behavior to cope with nuclear 
technology. One approach to identifying these changes is to 
look at the new language for foreign policy analysis which 
the adaptation process has spawned. For instance, it is now 
common to speak of economic alliances between suppliers and 
consumers, irrespective of military institutions or political 
ideologies . A decade ago nations were simply nuclear or non- 
nuclear. Today these distinctions are not adequate. A nation 
may have exploded a nuclear device yet is not considered a 
nuclear weapons state until it possesses the ability to 
deliver it. Furthermore, even the less developed nations are 

17 



being categorized by their "nearness" to achieving nuclear 
status. Clearly a new langauge has evolved to communicate 
this change in "nuclear" relations. 

1 . New Language 

The word "nuclear" invokes bad connotations like the 
word "cancer." It is hard to distinguish between the nuclear 
power to build from its power to destroy. The Eisenhower 
administration tried to give nuclear technology a new look, 
with its Atoms for Peace Program, but the technology grew 
faster than man's ability to control its usefulness or appli- 
cation. Today nuclear power is synonymous with political 
power, military power, and economic independence. Even the 
original dangers associated with nuclear energy in the 
scientific sense have acquired dangerous connotations in the 
political sense — dangers not originally thought about or 
planned for by the nuclear safety engineers. New terms are 
used to describe these dangers such as "proliferation," 
"fast breeder reactors," "waste disposal," "environmental 
impact," "technology transfers," and "nuclear blackmail." 
In the last case, a handful of terrorists can, with a few 
ounces of plutonium, elevate non-state actors to equal terms 
with the most powerful nations in the world. New terms for 
explaining the change to international relations must there- 
fore be used in a new framework of foreign policy analysis. 



13 



2 . Political 

The inadequacy of treating the new age of nuclear 
politics with the standard rules of political analysis is 
illustrated by the effect of "breeder reactors" on time. 
Safeguards, designed into the Non-proliferation Treaty, (NPT) , 
have worked well for over a decade by relying on open inspec- 
tion to signal a diversion from commercial manufacturers of 
energy to military applications. Once detected, diplomatic 
pressures by other treaty members were counted on to force 
the issue to a satisfactory conclusion. However, according 
to Dr. Joseph Nye, one of Carter's top advisors, breeder 
reactors provide states with readily available quantities of 
weapons grade plutonium. This military capability may be 
used as a last resort by a nation reacting to preserve its 
national interests in a crisis. "This evolution would leave 
less time for diplomacy to work in cases where intentions 
were volatile. * Therefore, the time constraint which 
enabled diplomatic intervention in a previous decade is now 
gone . 

3 . Military 

The recent constraints imposed on the political 
interaction of nations by nuclear proliferation are also 
evident in the military sphere. The state of nuclear 
weapons technology has recently advanced to the point where 
the two superpowers, the U.S. and Soviet Union, have had to 
avoid on occasion direct intervention in crisis situations. 



19 



It is SIPRI's belief that "...the nuclear arsenals of the 
great powers have grown so large as to exceed any conceivable 
political or military need." L - 1 Even conventional responses 
by these nuclear superpowers are considered too dangerous to 
attempt. Mercenaries or political proxies are substituted 
for great power interests in places such as Angola and Zaire. 

While the United States and the Soviet Union remain 
hamstrung by their overabundance of military power, several 
other nations have rushed into the resultant power vacuum to 
exercise conventional economic and military politics. Just 
recently, for instance, the world witnessed the major roles 
of France and Cuba in the African continent. 

Other countries such as India, Brazil, and Iran are 

l~191 • 54 1 
striving for what is now known as "regional hegemony ." L 

It appears that nuclear technology has hastened the decline 

of bipolarity between the super "nuclear" powers and given 

rise to new independent actions between regional military 

powers. The immediate threat of nuclear proliferation may 

shift the focus of military power from the exclusive domain 

of the five nuclear weapons states to what Daniel Yergin has 

("191 • 49 1 
called a "nuclear weapons crowd." L * J 

Another change in international relations concerns 

the Third World's view of nuclear weapons as a way to 

achieve international recognition. As Daniel Yergin explains: 

In the United Nations and many other councils, the 
Third World countries have been asserting their in- 
dependence, declaiming on the subject of their 
equality, and in general, blaming the First World 
for all their problems. Some of them believe that 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons is one of the most 
visible ways to assert their power and influence . 1191 : 53 j 

20 



According to Ted Greenwood, "Most states with a 
nuclear potential regard these weapons as a political, not 
a military instrument by which to exert increased pressure 
internationally." 1 - : -I This seems to be the case in 
Syrian President Hafez Assad's trying to arrange a deal under 
which his country would obtain nuclear technology from India, 
which exploded a nuclear device in 1974. Though Syria has 
signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and thus formally 
renounced any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, Assad 
is reportedly convinced that Israel will never bargain for 

real peace until one of the Arab countries can wage nuclear 

[166:18] 
war . L J 

4 . Economic 

The incentives to maintain political and military 
parity — despite the rapid shifts in the traditional balance 
of power brought about by a proliferation of nuclear 
technology--have created a new worldwide economic order. 
Norman Fall, in his article "Atoms for Brazil, Danger for 
All," explains the recent change this way: 



Formerly, US domination of uranium enrichment 

technology precluded the entrance of other 

nations into nuclear competition. US control 

of the international market was jeopardized 

when projected commercial demands for enriched 

fuel exceeded the capacity of AEC plants, and 

countries such as Germany were forced to develop rcn.-|c fi i 

and trade experimental technologies for resources. ' J 



Therefore, nuclear economics, whether in the form of sources 
of raw uranium for electrical power plants or marketable 

21 



technology in the form of reactors, or direct transfers of 
weapons, is a new force in the study of international relations 

The nuclear economy has developed certain characteris- 
tics which require a new pattern for international market 
behavior. As Tony Benn, Britain's Minister for Energy puts 
it : 



President Carter's new energy proposals confront 
the massed alliance of the world nuclear lobby. 
They have different interests and the friction 
lies where the national interests differ. Britain 
has lots of oil and coal. Italy doesn't. Saudi 
Arabia has huge quantities of oil. The United 
States has lots of uranium. It is not hard to 
find out why there are differences of approach; 
what we must look for is common interests . [164 :E19 ] 



Interests range from a desire to corner the nuclear 
reactor market, to achieving energy self-sufficiency. The 
effect of this competition has been to alter the world's 
economic structure. 

There is evidence to indicate that a shift from an 
oil-dominated economic system toward a nuclear economic 
system has already begun. The oil cartels are being watched 
closely by uranium cartels waiting and operating in the 
periphery. New collaborative networks have evolved from the 
group of nations recently made unwilling dependents of oil 
politics. The haves and the have-nots are vying for position 
which will maximize opportunities to gain secure sources of 
nuclear products. 

The magnitude of this new world economic order needs 
to be studied in sharp focus before economic and political 
policies are enacted. The next section of this chapter will 

22 



argue that a nuclear community already exists and is acting 
as a separate entity with a political life and force of its 
own. This international infrastructure stands to inherit 
the legacy of international power and influence which was 
developed to serve the oil economy. 

C. INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS 

If the United States were the only country with nuclear 
technology, the problem of managing the spread of nuclear 
energy utilization would be difficult enough. But there are 
already some thirty countries with nuclear reactor programs 
and at least five other countries with advanced breeder 
reactor programs. Ted Greenwood has warned, "If enough states 
go nuclear in rapid succession, the ability of international 
systems to adjust might be swamped." 1 - * * The Carter 
administration does not believe that nuclear isolationism is 
possible in today's world. The President has said that, 
"Planning for the future of nuclear power must be an inter- 
national effort involving all nations interested in nuclear 
power, consumers, and suppliers alike." 1 - " - 1 The follow- 
ing examples will show that political, military, and economic 
networks have emerged to deal with the problems associated 
with a new age of nuclear cooperation and competition. 

1 . Suppliers Club 

The most important cooperative initiative was Henry 
Kissinger's convening of a "Suppliers Club" L after 



23 



the surprising Indian atomic test in 1974. The club originally 
included seven nations possessing the capability to export 
nuclear technology. These supplier nations were later joined 
by eight prospective consumers during the club's secret delib- 
erations in London. 

The establishment of a new international deliberative 
body like the Suppliers Club illustrates the changing politi- 
cal environment. President Carter, speaking of this change, 
said last year: 

The hour is too late for business or politics, for 
diplomacy as usual.... An alliance for survival is 
needed, transcending regions and ideologies, if we 
are to assure mankind a safe passage into the 
Twenty-first Century. The nuclear community is 
currently working toward six interlocking agreements 
with allied, neutral, and communist cooperation in 
some. Taken together, the prospective accords 
would form key elements of a new world regime to 
introduce greater order into all stages of nuclear 
energy development . L61 : ° J 

Thus, the problem of proliferation, just one of the many 
aspects of nuclear power, has brought past adversaries to- 
gether in a new spirit of cooperation. In fact, few other 
events in recent history have been the source of such wide- 
spread agreement between the United States and Soviet Union 
than mutual concern over nuclear proliferation. 

2 . Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones 

Several quasi-legal political alliances have sprung 
up to deal with the inability of the established regulatory 
agencies to control recent nuclear proliferation. The move 
to prohibit nuclear weapons in Africa was initiated at a 

24 



meeting of the Organization of African Unity, where a Nuclear- 
Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) treaty was discussed. The Treaty of 
Tlatelolco (1967) , banning nuclear weapons in Latin America 
was used as a model for a regional agreement in Africa. 
William Epstein believes that a NWFZ treaty in Africa might 

create "new moral pressures" against South Africa's acquiring 

[33] 

nuclear weapons. 1 J Such alliances provide the networks 

through which formal agreements have been modified to fit the 
changing political environment. 

3 . Nonproliferation Treaty 

The formal Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) , signed by 
102 nations, came into force in 1970. (See Appendix) However, 
this delicate international arrangement failed to prevent a 
signatory like India from developing a weapons technology on 
its own. This led to an ad hoc international safeguard system 
outside the formal multilateral NPT framework. Canada, for 
example, India's chief source of nuclear technology, unilat- 
erally insisted that India not make nuclear explosives "of 
any description" within Canadian-supplied facilities. 
In addition to Canada's unilateral action, the formal NPT 
system of international safeguards had to be supplemented 
with economic sanctions. This illustrates the declining 
influence of the major economic powers. 

To handle the problem of the declining influence of 
the major economic powers in the world today, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski called for a "New international economic order." 



25 



Commenting on this Time magazine noted: 

The changes are necessary, he argues, because 'an 
old-world order is coming to an end and the shape 
of a new world community is yet to be defined. ' 
The old order, based largely on military power and 
nationalism, is giving way to "a technetronic age" 
in which there will be increasing emphasis on 
economic development and social justice. The old 
East-West ideological struggle will wane in impor- 
tance; the North-South struggle for control of vital 
raw materials will gain in importance . [194 :18] 

4 . Uranium Cartel 

Typical of how the international economic order is 
changing is the evolution of an international network involv- 
ing uranium ore. Considerable evidence has been uncovered by 
a federal grand jury, a House subcommittee, and a New York 
State legislative office's investigations that a uranium 
cartel has been active since 1972. Time magazine reported that 

The cartel — known as 'the club' to its members-- 
was organized by the Canadian government, initially 
to prevent what in 1972 looked like an imminent 
drop in the price of one of Canada's most important 
export commodities — uranium. The cartel included 
companies from Canada, Australia, Britain, France, 
and South Africa, as well as the governments of all 
those countries except Britain. Gulf Oil, the only 
known American participant, was represented through 
a Canadian subsidiary. The group set up a formal 
headquarters in Paris, complete with a paid secre- 
tariat, policy and operating committees, and 
detailed rules for dividing up markets and fixing 
prices. [175:96] 

This cartel has evolved partially as a response to the 
OPEC economic monopoly. It is an example of a new network 
made possible by the shifting economic environment. Robert 
Pfaltzgraff gives the following explanation of this shift: 



26 



In the midst of an international economic 
recession, the sale of nuclear technology (now 
a multibillion dollar business) affords export- 
ing countries tempting means of alleviating 
balance-of-payments deficits caused by higher 
oil prices and rampant inflation. Increasing 
oil prices provide an incentive for the exploi- 
tation of other energy sources, such as nuclear 
power, that have become competitive in price . [137 : 317] 

The "Suppliers Club," the Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone 
treaty, unilateral political sanctions, unified Third World 
opposition, and the Uranium Cartel are only a few examples of 
the many networks which have sprung up to deal with the changes 
touched on in the previous section. As nuclear technology 
continues to alter international relations, a new perspective 
may be useful to monitor the interaction between these networks. 

D. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

For the purpose of defining and accumulating data about 
international affairs, the analyst studies the "issues" of 
"the organizational processes," or utilizes any number of 
convenient models which serve to correlate the different 
perspectives. However, nuclear weapons, nuclear industries, 
or nuclear energy economies too often are studied as separate 
phenomena. This approach fails to recognize the interdepend- 
ence of all aspects of nuclear power, whether they be political, 
military, or economic. The nuclear interdependence described 
in the networks of the previous section must be examined in a 
broad framework to account for its various ancillary character- 
istics . 



27 



For example, the acquisition of a nuclear reactor by a 
developing country may compel a response on several different 
levels; uranium suppliers may compete to provide the country 
with raw materials; technology suppliers may try to sell more 
advanced facilities; neighboring countries may react to this 
potential power imbalance by entering the nuclear market; and 
the world community may impose political or economic sanctions 
to try to reduce the danger of terrorists acquiring the new 
source of nuclear blackmail. Each event serves as a signal 
to the other world powers that a political or economic 
"threshold" may have been crossed. 

This threshold can be detected in the reaction of other 
powers to a nuclear event. The reaction may appear as a 
press comment, public statement, or official denouncement of 
the nuclear event, or an expected reaction may be suppressed. 
A ready source of data about this reaction can be found by 
studying the nuclear networks that are tied to each other 
economically, militarily, and politically. 

1 . A Paradigm is Needed 

Because nuclear related events trigger responses over 

a wide range of issues, they permit the analyst to observe 

the various courses of national foreign policies in action. 

Therefore, as one observes how nations interact in response 

to nuclear events, patterns of diplomacy and interaction are 

revealed, and these patterns increase one's knowledge about 

contemporary international relations. What is needed then 

is a paradigm that will systematize the study of nuclear 

related events. 

28 



A useful paradigm for studying the reactions and inter- 
actions to a nuclear event might best be designed as a series 
of maps, each map representing a different nuclear network. 
One map might show countries with marketable nuclear reactor 
technology; a second map would show the members of formal and 
informal nonproliferation agreements; a third map might show 
regional military balances of power; and so forth until all 
the possible interaction networks are depicted by maps. The 
maps would be used alternately as templates or overlays to 
show event initiation or response paths. Once the network 
of interaction is established, changes could be detected by 
looking for responses within each network. For example, when 
a country like Brazil signs a nuclear reactor technology 
transfer agreement with West Germany, the maps would enable 
the analyst to predict several different reactions. A map of 
regional power states would help direct the analysis to the 
more obvious responses. However, to search for reactions to 
the nuclear event, "Brazil gets a nuclear reactor," beyond 
the obvious places requires a directive pattern. 

The analyst would conduct a "textscan" survey using 
the key variables that distinguish each network, e.g., 
"nuclear reactor sales" for one of the economic networks. 
However, if this paradigm is to have value as a useful 
predictive tool, the various maps must be related to each 
other in a visible, as well as theoretical, sense. A nuclear 
event in one sphere might then provide the kind of informa- 
tion that will help the analyst predict a "spillover" or 
"burnthrough" effect for a second or third sphere. 

29 



2 . Five-Step Methodology 

In a practical sense, the analyst would direct his 
scan toward probable ancillary reactions in networks other 
than the one where the original event occurred. A five-step 
methodology might be incorporated by the analyst to predict 
the likely consequences of a nuclear event. Continuing with 
the example of Brazil, the first step would involve a regional 
scan conducted in the newspapers of Brazil's Latin American 
neighbors for signs of military or economic repercussions 
caused by the event. Next, there should be a worldwide scan 
of the newspapers of the nations that are signatories of non- 
proliferation agreements. If the analyst's attention had 
been focused on these agreements, he might have been able to 
predict the strong U.S. opposition to the Brazil reactor deal 
because the Carter Administration has made nonproliferation 
a major item of American foreign policy. Furthermore, the 
analyst might expect that any political pressure used by the 
U.S. to try to dissuade the West Germans from completing the 
deal would have an impact on the French sale of a similar 
reactor to Pakistan. 

The third area of scan would be a survey of worldwide 
economic reaction. Here the analyst might detect a renewed 
effort by the major nuclear reactor exporters in the U.S., 
Westinghouse and General Electric, to apply pressure on the 
President and Congress to lift the ban on fast breeder reactor 
technology. This action would enable the American firms to 
reenter the overseas sales markets that are now being served 
by the European competition. 

30 



The fourth area to be scanned concerns energy depend- 
ency. Here the analyst might consider the ability of Brazil 
to act independent of oil politics as its nuclear generating 
power capabity increases. A correlation between nuclear 
energy production capacity and foreign policy might be con- 
structed which would reveal Brazil's dependency on oil 
decreasing in direct proportion to nuclear power production. 
But an additional concern for the analyst would be the new 
relationships which would begin to form as Brazil increased 
its dependency on the nations which supply uranium ore and 
reprocessed spent fuel, the nations which transport the 
radioactive components of the fuel cycle, train the operators 
and scientists of the Brazilian nuclear industry, and in 
general, become the new partners of a nuclear-related alliance 
system. 

The final step of the five step methodology used to 
direct the scan of the analysis is a general content examina- 
tion of public statements about the particular event. This 
last sweep through the press should provide the analyst with 
additional areas for research, areas which in a traditional 
framework would not be considered relevant to the analysis 
of the isolated event, "Brazil gets a nuclear reactor." The 
ability of this analytical approach, and particularly of this 
step, to monitor changes in international relations will 
depend on the analyst's disciplined attempt to account for 
the far-reaching and subtle effects of nuclear-related events. 
If such procedures as have been suggested are employed, a 



31 



broad conceptual framework for the study of nuclear events 
can contribute to the discovery of a wide range of foreign 
policy issues and patterns of interaction in international 
relations . 

To illustrate the ability of a nuclear power per- 
spective to detect trends or changes in international re- 
lations, this thesis will turn its focus to the European 
continent. The European continent was chosen to illustrate 
the analytical technique of the nuclear perspective because 
the nations of Europe exhibit a diversity of political 
issues as well as various stages of economic and industrial 
development. Furthermore, the relationships that have de- 
veloped between Eastern and Western Europe clearly reflect 
new trends in international cooperation and conflict which 
are evolving in the current age of detente. Whereas the 
European continent will be used to show how the use of a 
nuclear perspective is a valuable analytical tool, the same 
analysis could be used for any other continent to produce 
a similar continental perspective. 



32 



II . THE CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 



A. THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY: A FORCE FOR THE FISSION OR 
THE FUSION OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS 



A recent change in international relations has been 
described as "The Scarcity Society" by William Ophus writing 
in the book, ' The Silent Bomb' A guide to the Nuclear Energy 
Controversy . He observed that a major event in 1973 triggered 
this change: 



Historians may see 1973 as a year dividing one age 
from another. The Shah of Iran raised the price of 
his oil by 100%. He accompanied his announcement 
with a blunt warning to the industrial nations that 
the cheap and abundant energy 'party' was over. 
From now on, the resource on which our whole civili- 
zation depends would be scarce, and the affluent 
world would have to live with this f act . L133 : 266 J 



The effect of this epoch-making announcement was to send 
the industrial nations of the world into a strange new behavior 
pattern. Each nation began to exert all the political and 
economic power at its disposal to acquire and hoard all po- 
tential energy supplies. Soon, however, the shock subsided 
and the world engaged in the avid search for solutions . All 
nations began to cooperate with one another to combine 
resources and technology in concerted attempts to acquire 
the energy reserves each felt unable to achieve by itself. 
This became particularly true for the less resource-endowed 
industrial nations of Eastern and Western Europe. When the 



33 



dust had settled from all this frantic reshuffling, a new 

economic order had begun to emerge to deal with "the Scarcity 

B . . ,,[133:266] 
Society. L J 

The search for new sources of energy continues today. 
Failure to discover a safe, inexpensive energy panacea has 
led the search back to former solutions like nuclear reactors 
to generate electricity. The nuclear energy option for wide- 
spread use had been tabled in the late 1960 's for several 
reasons. It was associated with the dangers present in the 
current bipolar strategic arms race and the atomic stockpiles 
that resulted. Nuclear reactors were expensive, impractical, 
and became the target of alarmist campaigns during the wave of 
environmental protectionism that characterized the early 70' s. 
In countries like Japan, nuclear power was considered repre- 
hensible. It took the oil crisis to reorient that country's 
national priorities to include nuclear power as a viable 
alternative to oil. 

The U.S. was in many ways hurt worst by the oil dilemma. 
The impact of oil shortages was felt not only because of the 
tremendous American industrial dependence on oil but also 
because the average citizen found his livelihood threatened 
when transporation by automobile became expensive. This had 
the effect of turning the original popular support for en- 
vironmental programs into outright opposition. At the federal 
government level, the political constraints caused by oil 
diplomacy found that U.S. official endorsement for the 
Israeli foreign policy was anathema to Arab oil interests. 
Thus the U.S. was one of the first nations to reconsider the 

34 



nuclear energy option and to weigh its advantages in light 
of abundant U.S. uranium supplies and reactor technology. 

U.S. leadership in reopening the nuclear question led 
to profound advances in techniques for producing electricity 
from uranium fuel. Soon, "closet case" atomic researchers, 
technology engineers, and uranium suppliers and processors 
emerged from the shadows to enter the international arena. 

The oil cartelization legacy was inherited by a new "Uranium 

Til ^ • 1 fifi 1 
Cartel" 1 * J which helped to transform international 

relations in an orderly attempt to exploit the economic ad- 
vantages of nuclear energy. The transformation of interna- 
tional relations on a global scale was touched upon earlier 
in Chapter I of this discussion. However, the international 
changes brought about by the trend towards a nuclear based 
energy economy only describe the tip of the iceberg of world- 
wide international cooperation and competition over nuclear 
energy. 

This chapter focuses the problem of nuclear power rela- 
tions on the European continent. The initial reaction to 
the Shah's announcement in Europe, according to Ophus, was 
"to reduce once proud nation states to behavior that managed, 
as one observed put it, to combine the characteristics of an 
ostrich and a flock of hens." L : J Soon however, this 
concentration of highly industrial European nations combined 
their forces and resources into a coalition of commercial 
enterprise which exists for reasons beyond the cause of 
simply achieving energy sufficiency. The effect of these 
European nuclear consortiums has been to transform the 

35 



independent European nation-states into new, influential 
supranational economic and political entities. 

The forces present in this new European economic environ- 
ment foster both cooperation and competition among the 
Western European partners. Meanwhile, Eastern Europeans are 
watching with not only a shared interest in energy independence 
but also with an interest in economic expansion. Thus the 
issue of nuclear power generation as well as the newer 
prospects of commercially exploiting nuclear reactor technol- 
ogy as demonstrated by the Western Europeans is of great 
interest to the watchful East Europeans. 

In some cases the force that binds the West European 
nations together has grown to include the East European 
nations as well. This new socioeconomic relationship, promoted 
by the combined East-West European desire to develop new energy 
sources free of political constraints, fosters a trend toward 
a "Pan-European" economic union. Whether or not this trend 
can survive about the din of politics and superpower inter- 
vention is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
the effect of a successful West European power industry may 
provide the light that attracts the moth, the force that brings 
East Europeans out of the Soviet economic and political sphere 
of influence into a new Pan-European economy. Furthermore, 
nuclear power has already provided some West European countries 
with a measure of independence and self-sufficiency that exists 
apart from U.S. domination. The following sections in this 
chapter will explore the rise of the nuclear power industry 
in Europe to determine the extent it has accelerated the 

36 



emergence of a new European economic order. Finally, an 
argument will be presented that the ability of Europeans 
to stand alone will depend on their ability to stand together. 
and the nuclear power adventure is the first real Pan-European 
experiment. The success of this venture will depend on the 
nuclear power industry: a force of fusion or fission in 
European relations. 

B. EVALUATING THE NUCLEAR ENERGY OPTION FOR WESTERN EUROPE 

Western Europeans are considering several energy alterna- 
tives which they hope will enable them to overcome the im- 
pending oil shortage crisis. Mr. Guido Brunner, the energy 
commissioner of the European Economic Community (EC) , argues 
that a community heavily dependent on imported energy (5 8% in 
1976) cannot ignore any new energy sources. He predicts that 
new non-nuclear sources, such as solar and geothermal power, 

will account for no more than five per cent of Europe's total 

[122 • 491 . • . . 
energy supply by the year 2000. J It is his opinion, 

then, that nuclear power must be given priority in Western 
Europe's energy future. 

Several European ministers attending the International 
Energy Agency meeting held in October 19 77 in Paris confirmed 
the predictions of the priority of nuclear power. Though the 
final communique of the meeting favored the curtailment of 
nuclear power, a number of countries disassociated themselves 
from this communique showing that most member countries re- 
garded further development of nuclear power as essential for 
meeting their energy needs in the eighties. A majority of 

37 



ministers committed themselves to steady expansion of nuclear 
generating capacities as the main and indispensable element 
in attaining group objectives of continued economic growth 
and lower unemployment. -* 

1. The European Community (EC) 

The EC has long been convinced that Europe needs a 
big nuclear program. The community's nine member countries 
now import 80% of their uranium supplies. By the year 2000, 
the EC will account for one-third of total world demand for 
uranium. Last year nuclear power provided only 2.1% of the 
EC's energy needs, but the EC Commission expects the share 
to rise to ten percent in 1985 and 20-25 percent in the year 
2000.'- 1 J The EC, therefore, has backed the development 
of the controversial fast breeder reactors and reprocessing 
plants which produce more reusable fuel than they consume. 
The Commission hopes to rely on the new fast breeder repro- 
cessing technology to cut Europe's dependence on foreign 
sources of uranium and oil. According to a Ford Foundation 
study entitled Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: 



Approximately 90% of the world's present and 
planned nuclear generating capacity requires 
slightly enriched uranium as fuel . The 
questions of assurance of enrichment services 
will thus be critical for virtually all 
nations with a substantial commitment to 
nuclear power. The major exception to this 
is Canada, whose reactors use natural uranium. 
In the past, the United States has provided 
such services for all countries outside of the 
Communist world, using enrichment plants built 
in connection with its weapons program. The 
Soviet Union provides similar services for its 
reactors and those in Eastern Europe, and has 
contracted to provide some enrichment for 
Western European countries . [161 : 36 5] 

no 



The drastic reduction of nuclear power development in 
the United States, a consequence of President Carter's campaign 
to half the proliferation of the weapons grade plutonium 
produced by the fast breeder reactors, has caused the Europeans 
to accelerate their own development of a nuclear fuel produc- 
tion industry. According to a Rand report, Europe's Changing 
Energy Relations , prepared for the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, "By the early 19 80* s, Western European uranium enrich- 
ment capacities will furnish most enrichment services for 
European reactors, ending Europe's nearly complete dependence 
on the United States and--in the late 1970 's at least — heavy 
dependence on the USSR. " '- 117 : V111 -l 

For OECD-Europe as a whole, nuclear power is going to 
be, by current expectations, the most rapidly expanding source 

F* i n *7 "2 "7 ~\ 

during the decade ahead. * J Table I shows the projected 
growth of nuclear power in six Western European countries and 
the United States. 



TABLE I 

ESTIMATED NUCLEAR POWER GROWTH, WESTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND UNITED STATES 

(In billion watts, GW) 



Country 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1990 


West Germany 


3 


19 


45 


77 


France 


2 


20 


56 


90 


Italy 


1 


1 


26 


62 


United Kingdom 


5 


11 


15 


31 


Spain 


1 


9 


24 


42 


Sweden 


3 


7 


11 


16 


United States 


40 


83 


205 


385 



SOURCE: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Uranium: Resources, Production, and 
Demand , OECd", Paris, 1976. Estimated as of spring 1975 



One of the EC's most glaring failures has been its 
inability to develop a common energy policy to deal with the 
coming nuclear energy decade. Despite endless declarations, 
the Community is little nearer to agreement now than when the 
oil crisis broke in 1973. J But one must remember that 
neither OECD-Europe nor the European Community is a unit with 
uniform conditions and policies. In particular, energy 
structures of the individual countries vary, and are subject 
to different national policy orientations. Thus, in order to 
understand Western Europe's nuclear energy policies, it is 
necessary to examine the nuclear policies of the individual 
states. Through such an examination one notes that elements 
of cooperation and conflict operate within as well as between 
these national policies. 

The nuclear industries of the West were built with an 
eye on a lucrative new export market for complete nuclear 
power stations. That is how it developed in the 1960 's with 
two American firms, Westinghouse and General Electric dominat- 
ing sales. L 4 8 : 100 J since then f the mid-1970 's recession has 
sent Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Sweden into 
the development of full-fledged nuclear industries. Table II 
shows France projected to lead the other West European 
countries in uranium production capacities through 19 85. 
The reason France has outdistanced its Western European 
neighbors in the nuclear power industry is best understood by 
examining the way France exercises its nuclear option. 



40 



TABLE II 

URANIUM PRODUCTION CAPACITIES AND WORLD URANIUM 
REQUIREMENTS, 1974 THROUGH 1985 

(In Thousand Tons Uranium/ Year) 







1974 


1980 


1985 


Country 


(existing) 


(projected) 


(attainable) 


France 




1.8 


3.0 


3-3.5 


Spain and Portugal 




0.2 


0.8 


1.0 


Sweden 










1.3 


Other Western Europe 




0.2 


0.4 


1.4-1.9 


Gabon and Niger 




2.0 


5.2 


7.2 


South Africa 




2.7 


11.2 


13.8 


Australia 







3.3 


>5.0 


United States 




13.5 


25.0 


40.0 


Total production 










capacity, estimated 


25.1 


60.0 


87.0 


Free World uranium 










requirements , 










estimated 




18.0 


48-53 


38-101 



SOURCE: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Uranium: Resources, Production, and 
Demand, OECD, Paris, 1976, pp. 25 and 32. 



2 . France 

France's nuclear program dates from the days of the 
Fourth Republic and was enthusiastically embraced by DeGaulle 
as part of his desire to develop an independent atomic strike 
force. The program accelerated in 1974 after the rise in the 
world oil price, as illustrated in Table III. Officials en- 
visioned the installation of nuclear plants that would cover 

fH7 • 48] 
about 20% of France's energy needs by 19 85. 



41 



TABLE III 

FRENCH ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 19 74 AND 
19 75 ACTUAL AND 19 8 5 PROJECTIONS 

(In Million Tons Oil Equivalent) 









r— 

Projections for 1985 




Projected in 








Project- 


March 1976 


"Adjust- 








ed in 


able 




1974 


1975 


July 


"Hard Supple- 


Source of Energy 


(actual) 


(actual) 


1975 


Core" ment" 


Coal 


32 


28 


30 


25 


Gas 


16 


17 


37 


37 


Oil 


112 


102 


96 


98 


Nuclear elec- 








13 


tricity 


3 


4 


60 


55 


Hydroelectric 


13 


13 


14 


14 


New energies 


— 


— 


3 


3 


Total 


176 


164 


240 


232 245 

i 



SOURCE: Rapport de la Commission de l'energie du VII plan , 
Paris, 26 March 1976, pp. 5 and 30. 



The overall French program has since been scaled down 
due more to the pressures from the growing antinuclear movement 
throughout Western Europe than to a lessening of the French 
government's commitment to nuclear energy. Supporting this 
conclusion is the fact, reported in The Economist, that: 



France sent more delegates to the May 77 Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (the UN spin-off) 
conference in Salzburg than any other country. 
More in fact, than the United States and Russia 
put together. The large size of the French 
contingent reflects its bullishness on nuclear 
power. [9:100] 



A key element in the government's program has been 
breeder reactors. Their attraction is twofold. By producing 

42 



more fuel than they consume, the breeders, at least theoreti- 
cally, would cut down dependence on uranium imports, and 
officials expect to use France's lead in the field to carve 
out a lucrative slice of the overseas market. 

The export earnings from nuclear technology were 
supposed to defray the mounting costs of petroleum imports. 
Three years ago, the French began to push the sale of 
reactors in the Middle East, Pakistan and South Korea. The 
French government has been unwilling, so far, to forego 
export opportunities for its powerfully organized nuclear 
industries. In fact, the government, especially the semi- 
autonomous Atomic Energy Commission, played an active role in 
initiating several of the export deals. 

The engineering f irm, Framatome , now principally owned 
by the government's Atomic Energy Commission and largely purged 
of its connection with Westinghouse , also occupies a prominent 
position. Together with Alsthom and the Compagnie Electro- 
Mecanique, it forms the French industrial group that goes out 
for export orders. These French industrial groups have 
cooperated with other Western European industrial groups in 

some areas, e.g., the development and export planning for fast 

a u [117:76] 

breeder reactors . 

Framatome currently has the capability to produce 

seven or eight Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS) per year. 

The domestic market will probably absorb five per year, so 

Framatome is trying to sell two or three NSSS ' s per year to 

- _ • [81:793] 

foreign countries . 



43 



European correspondent Fernand Auberjonois reported 
that France's energy situation calls for the most ambitious 
nuclear power program in the West. She depends on imports 
for 75% of her energy needs. The search for offshore oil in 
territorial waters has not been rewarding, so far, and 
France's coal deposits are much smaller than West Germany's 
or Britain's. Her natural gas reserves in the southwest, now 

fully tapped, are expected to start running down in about six 

[10:10] 
years . L J 

The decision to go nuclear on a very large scale was 
made shortly after the fourfold increase in oil prices in 1973. 
The government adopted an ambitious program calling for the 
construction of 50 nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts 
each by 1935. 

According to Auberjonois, the opposition to the govern- 
ment's accelerated program emphasizes the safety factor far 
less than another problem which the public fears more: 
"giantism and overemphasis. France has moved too far from 
the rural to the industrial age, and this fairly recently. 
The people have not accepted the change. Hence the protest. 
And the nuclear power plants have become a symbol of giantism. " ^ 

Nevertheless, the French Government has withstood the 
onslaught of the opponents of nuclear energy better than most 
other Western European governments. To deal with domestic 
opposition, the government has tactfully avoided the debates 
and instead played up the economic benefits to the industrial 
sector. A day before a rally against a proposed reactor site 
in Creys-Malville , President Valery Giscard d'Estaing chose to 

44 



visit a nearby uranium-enrichment plant to assert his commit- 
ment to nuclear programs. In the aftermath of the violence, 
officials sought to inject an element of nationalism in the 

debate by pointing out that some of the protesters were West 

[10:10] 
Germans . L J 

3 . West Germany 

Indeed the most dramatic demonstration of the pressure 
from opponents of nuclear energy has taken place in West 
Germany — one of the Western European nations with the most 
advanced programs. Twenty-two years after West Germany first 
gained access to atomic power, the government is involved in 
bitter debate with industry and environmental groups over the 
future of nuclear energy in this densely populated industrial 
country. Despite widespread public resistance, Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt's government says it is determined "to keep open 

the nuclear option," including the possibility of plutonium- 

« i -a c 4. u a f20:ll] 

fueled fast breeders. 

West Germany is in a different position than France 
because the Germans have no uranium of their own and are 
therefore totally dependent on imports. Consequently, the 
West Germans have felt the need to pursue the breeder technol- 
ogy to gain independence in the face of possible energy 

. . [20:11] 
shortages . L 

In West Germany, the Kraftwerk Union (Kwu) , a joint 

affliate of Siemens and AEG-Telefunken is the centerpiece of 

the nuclear equipment industry and the principal promoter of 

exports. German critics have charged the Bonn government with 

45 



looking the other way while nuclear industrialists, subsidized 
with large government research and exploration funds, prepare 
export deals that may assist weapon proliferation. -■ 

In 1975 West Germany contracted to sell Brazil a 
uranium enrichment plant and a nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facility, both of which could be used to produce materials for 
atomic weapons. American reaction to this proposed deal put 
pressure on the West Germans to cancel on the grounds that in 
the rush for markets the security implications may have been 
swept aside. Meanwhile, the Germans are withholding final 
approval for the export of the "sensitive technology" part of 
the Brazilian deal. 

4 . Sweden 

Sweden originally shared the French and German commit- 
ment to the nuclear option. In the late 1960 's, the Social- 
Democratic government decided to build 11 nuclear power plants 
(capacity of about 6000 MW by 1982) . During the oil crisis, 

it raised its sights to 24 plants by 1990, with construction 

F 11 7 • 4 9 1 
of the 13 additional plants due to begin in the 19 80' s. L 

3y 19 75, Sweden had five nuclear plants in operation, 

with a combined capacity of about 3200 MW, and one plant about 

mnr [117:50] 
ready to start. Then came the elections of September 1976. 

Environmental opposition to Sweden's nuclear program was believed 

to have played a key role in turning out the Social Democrats, 

who had been in power since 1932. The Center party that had 

campaigned for stopping all nuclear electricity generation in 

Sweden on environmental grounds also lost votes, but in coalition 

46 



with the Liberals and Conservatives, both supporters of the 
previous government's nuclear program, the Center was able to 
lead the new government. The coalition apparently compromised 
by continuing the operation of the five existing plants and 
starting up the sixth, but delaying the activation of two 
others from 1977 to 1978. This compromise also stopped con- 
struction of the three remaining plants until a review by a 

royal commission (and possibly a referendum) confirms the 

[117:50] 
program . L J 

5 . Italy 

In contrast to France, Germany and Sweden, Italy has 
not yet really initiated its ambitious nuclear energy program. 
Obstacles have hampered it from the start, so the programmed 
capacity is unlikely to be approached by 1985. This program, 
calling for more than twenty reactors in operation by 1985 
appears to be endangered primarily by soaring costs and the 
near-paralysis brought on by the internal political crisis. 

6 . Spain 

Spain already has three nuclear power plants in opera- 
tion, one built by a French consortium, another by General 
Electric and a third by Westinghouse . Westinghouse is now 
working on six reactors on three sites, staggered for comple- 
tion within periods of six months. General Electric has three 
reactors on two sites under way."- - 1 Meanwhile, the Spanish 
government is concerned about the implications of President 
Carter's new restrictive nuclear policy to ban the use of 

47 



Plutonium in nuclear reactors. Spanish officials want to know 
what restrictions, controls, and new costs will be involved for 
their American-built reactors. 

Spain buys its uranium in Niger, Canada, and South 
Africa and has it sent to the United States to be enriched for 
use in power reactors. The used fuel rods, which contain 
Plutonium, are sent to Britain for reprocessing. 

7 . Britain 

Britain, a pioneer in nuclear power generation, had 
14 power plants in operation by the end of 1974. In the 
Britain of 1977, the lobby pressing for the fast breeder 
program, headed by the Atomic Energy Authority has been called 

"an extremely powerful one, amounting to a military-industrial 

("141 • 92l 
complex in itself." 1 J 

But Britain's relatively low-key nuclear electricity 

program is suffering from continued troubles with reactor 

design. The government's commitment to several British 

designs, including the steam-generating heavy water reactor, 

has been strongly challenged on economic grounds by the Atomic 

r f> 4 • fi 7 1 

Energy Authority. In September 19 76, moreover, a royal 

commission on environmental pollution startled the public with 
a report urging postponement of all further expansion of 

nuclear energy in Britain until its environmental and other 

[117 • 52] 
effects had been thoroughly studied . 



48 



8 . The Netherlands 

In the Netherlands, opinion polls indicate that more 
than half the Dutch have doubts about nuclear energy. The 
government has run into opposition to plans for the construc- 
tion of three new atomic plants and the burial of nuclear 

[85:6] 
wastes . L J 

Both for financial reasons and for domestic political 

considerations, the Dutch government has sought to carry out 

its breeder reactor plans as part of a joint program involving 

France, Belgium, Italy and West Germany. The extent to which 

Western European countries have had to pool their efforts to 

reverse the downward trend faced by troubled nuclear energy 

programs will be discussed in the next chapter. It should be 

clear, however, that the decision to choose the nuclear option 

in Western European capitals, has been a force of both fusion 

and fission in domestic-European relations. 

C. WESTERN EUROPE COOPERATES TO GENERATE 

The nuclear power industries in Western Europe have combined 
forces and resources to overcome the recent slump in domestic 
nuclear power production and export sales. Nuclear power in 
Europe entails its own import dependencies, however. Except 
France, no Western European country has so far found and 
developed uranium deposits on its own territory adequate for 
fueling a significant number of reactors; and so far none is 

capable of providing uranium enrichment services for the fuel 

^ • ., • 4. *.■ [117:38] 

supply of civilian power stations . 

49 



Naturally then, the industrial nations of Western Europe, 
along with Japan and the Soviet Union, have been united 
recently by their hostility to the Carter plans for a new 
agreement that would virtually ban the manufacture, use or 
sale of plutonium and the equipment that produces it.'- -^ 

The West European countries realize, however, that success- 
ful development of the plutonium-burning fast breeder reactor 
is their principal hope of obtaining adequate energy supplies. 
Sharing this interest, they agree that Carter's attempt to ban 
plutonium is unrealistic for countries with small energy 
resources . 

Underlining the Europeans' determination to continue with 
the breeder, France, West Germany and three other Common Market 
countries have pooled resources for research, development, 
licensing and construction of liquid-sodium-cooled fast breeder 
reactors. The industrial cooperation agreements followed 
statements by French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing that 
the fast breeder was an "indispensable part of France's 
energy program."'- * ■" The industrial cooperation agreements 
are accompanied by other inter-European accords to formalize 
the relationships that are developing in the joint pursuit of 
energy independence through nuclear technology. 

Under the European accords, France and West Germany will 
be shareholders in a joint company called Serena that will 
hold license to all fast breeder know-how developed by the 
two sides separately or together. The French breeder engineer- 
ing firm Novatome and a West German-Belgian-Dutch breeder 
builder will pay licensing fees going back to France's 

50 



Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) , the leader in develop- 
ing fast breeder technology, during the first years of breeder 
commercialization. Belgium and the Netherlands have a share 
in Serena on the German side, while Italian participation—now 

limited to licensing agreements with CEA--is likely to be 

T40 • 12 1 
formalized in the near future. J 

Supplementing the industrial side of breeder cooperation 
is a Franco-German research and development cooperation agree- 
ment that links German's Inter-atom and Karlsruhe Research 
Center on one side with CEA on the other. This program will 
cost around one billion francs ($200m) a year for the next few 
years shared by the two sides. - 1 The agreement grew out 
of negotiations last year when the French and West German 
governments decided to combine forces in a $170-million 
research effort. " ^ Through these agreements France and 
Germany made clear their commitment to the rapid commercial 
development of fast-breeder reactors, and the widespread use 
of plutonium as a fuel. 

Both sides consider the possibility of joint exports to 
be one of the main incentives behind the agreement, although 
each side will technically be free to embark on export deals 
alone. 0:1 -' For example, both France and Germany have 
recently signed nuclear export contracts with Iran. The 
French contract is worth up to $3 billion dollars for two 
900-megawatt nuclear power plants and a ten year supply of 
enriched uranium fuel. At the same time, a West German 
company is building Iran's first two nuclear power plants of 
1200 megawatts each. They are expected to be in operation 

51 



two years before the French-built plants are commissioned, 
one by the end of 1983 and the other in 1984 . '- 53 : 5 ■■ 

The possibility of other countries taking licenses under 
the French-German agreements has not been ruled out. Other 
existing accords create a company, including French, West 
German, Dutch, Belgian and Italian interests, to market 
breeders . 

One argument made in favor of such cooperative ventures 
stresses that Western Europe holds a technological lead over 
the United States. Officials say the Americans will probably 
come around to accepting the inevitability of breeders, and 
Europe should be prepared to meet its needs and seize a share 
of the export market. J Thus Western European nuclear 
cooperative production efforts are not likely to back down in 
the fact of American diplomatic pressure for nonproliferation . 

In spite of fears concerning the effects of Carter's 
proposed plutonium restrictions, the Western European govern- 
ments still support the U.S. -led drive to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons inherent in breeder reactors exports. They 
stress, however, that new restrictions should be "negotiated 
internationally and take into account commercial considera- 
tions. 10 2:16 J Last year the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, based in Vienna, (I.A.E.A.) completed a two year study 
of multi-national recycling centers as a way to achieve 
greater economy and minimize proliferation. Such centers 
would, it has concluded, be most economical if they handled 
fuel from plants generating 30,000 megawatts. That is almost 
half the total production of all nuclear plants in the world. 

52 



The proposed centers would be set up on a pay-as-you-go basis 
by private industry under international supervision. The 
report noted that if such an international approach were to 
replace the current trend toward national recycling centers, 
then early political action would be necessary. : ^ 

The proposed multi-national recycling center failed to 
materialize. It seems apparent that cross-national cooperation 
for nuclear power production has not progressed beyond the 
commercial agreements which exist between the separate national 
industries. Prospects for formal political agreements between 
these nations are currently unfavorable in light of the un- 
willingness of most governments to subjugate their individual 
economic interests and national sovereignty to an international 
regulatory agency. 

A typical example of the unwillingness of Western European 
countries to submit to international control involves France's 
opposition to two EC nuclear deals. One concerns the site for 
the Jet (Joint European Torus) , a big experimental device which 
would be one step on the road to fusion energy. The other 

concerns nuclear safeguards to be applied by the Euratom 

T 5 9 • 32 1 
countries (the same Nine as the EC states .r 

The dispute over the Jet site has been going on for over 

a year. Everyone agrees that fusion could well provide the 

cheap, inexhaustible energy supplies of the future. But they 

disagree totally on where to put the device. An independent 

committee recommended Ispra in Italy. Germany, however, wants 

Garching near Munich, and Britain is pushing its site at 

Culham. Eventually all seemed willing to accept a majority 

53 



verdict on the site except the French, who insisted on their 
own research center at Cadarache. When pressed for an alter- 
native, they suggested the Cern laboratories near Geneva, not 

even in the community. Jet may now be dead as a community 

. [59:32] 
project. L J 

French resistance has also upset efforts by Euratom to 

regulate its relationship with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. The I. A. E. A., the watchdog of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 

f 191 • 5 8 1 
Treaty (NPT) , L J sends inspectors to countries which have 

ratified the pact to make sure no one is making a bomb. But 
France, which has not signed the NPT, turned the regulation 
down, worried, it appears, about having the NPT procedures 
imposed on it by the back door. 

Cooperative efforts by Western European nuclear power in- 
dustries have deteriorated under several pressures: political 
bickering, national jealousies, economic selfishness, diplo- 
matic restraints from the U.S., and a rising international 
group of outspoken environmentalists. This is in sharp 
contrast to the nuclear energy policies of Eastern Europe. 
Paul Hoffman reported in a New York Times article about Soviet 
plans for a plutonium-based economy. He reported that the 
Soviet Union and allied countries expected to see fast breeders 
supplying 50% of their nuclear power engineering requirements 
by the year 2000. * ^ Furthermore, according to Hoffman, 
instead of the environmental dissension which has plagued the 
West, "the scientific, technical and economic planners of 
Eastern Europe are convinced that nuclear power plants 
'contribute to the environmental improvement, 1 and appear to 

54 



have no misgivings about the use of plutonium as a nuclear 
fuelJ 74 ^ 

The East's commitment to fast breeder reprocessing technol- 
ogy has suddenly become significant to Western Europe. While 
We tern nuclear reactor programs stall over the plutonium 
issue and the U.S. and Canada have imposed an embargo on 
uranium in support of Carter's fast breeder technology boycott, 
the Soviets have become the single most important source of 
uranium enrichment services for the European Community as a 
whole. According to EURATOM data of 1976 as reported in the 
Rand paper, Europe's Changing Energy Relations , the Soviets 
will supply more than half in 1977, and more than two-fifths 
in the two following years, before Western Europe's own 
supplies take up the slack of rapidly diminishing U.S. supplies, 
as Table IV showsJ 117:45 ^ 



TABLE IV 

SUPPLY OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT UNDER CONTRACT 
TO USERS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 





Total Quantity 


Percentage Sh 


are of Sources 


Year 


(tsw) 


U.S. USSR 


EURODIF URENCO* 


1976 


2,374 


74 26 





1977 


4,357 


45 55 





1978 


6,217 


45 46 


5 4 


1979 


8,809 


33 42 


24 1 


1980 


12,467 


27 28 


35 10 



URENCO is a joint British, Dutch, West German organiza- 
tion with plants in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 

EURODIF is a joint venture involving France (52%) , Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, and Iran, which is building a gaseous 
diffusion plant in France. 



SOURCE: Rand Report R-20 86-15A. 1 



[117:45] 



55 



European overtures to the Russians have been greeted with 
tacit approval by the United States. Washington even permitted 
shipments of American uranium to the Soviet Union for process- 
ing into nuclear fuel destined for West German power plants. " J 
Washington did not fear unauthorized procurement of this weapons 
grade fuel because Soviet control over its nuclear industries 
is effective. For example, all spent fuel for Soviet-supplied 
reactors in Eastern Europe must be returned to the USSR. 
American, Canadian and French controls of the fuel cycle in 
their customer countries have never been so tight. " J 

The net result of this interim fuel enrichment contract 
with the Soviet Union is to shift Western European nuclear 
power industries into a new dependency on the East. How long 
this dependency lasts will depend on how quickly the European 
Community can overcome the recent forces of dissension which 
currently threaten their initial cooperative successes. It 
is paradoxical that fast breeder reactors were endorsed by 
Western European industrial nations as the economic means by 
which they intended to wean themselves from an American de- 
pendency; a process which resulted in Soviet dependency. 

On the other hand, temporary cooperation with the nuclear 
industries of the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies could 
develop into new opportunities to revive the foundering 
nuclear prospects in the West. For instance the current 
program designed to expand the export capabilities of the 
Western nuclear consortiums should reach fruition about the 
same time dependency on Soviet enrichment ends. Since both 
Eastern and Western European countries are seeking the same 

56 



independence from Superpower economic hegemony, a combined 
cooperative effort in development of the nuclear option is 
not only possible but probable. 

This section has examined the successes and failures of 
Western Europeans to combine their nuclear power policies 
into corporate alliances to achieve both energy independence 
and commercial success. The next section of this chapter 
will examine the aspirations of the Eastern Europeans as they 
elect the nuclear options and the political and economic 
restraints which hinder their progress. The nuclear power 
industry will then provide a "benchmark" to assess the forces 
of fusion and fission in Eastern European relations. 



D. PROSPECT FOR COOPERATION AS EASTERN EUROPE CHOOSES THE 
NUCLEAR OPTION 



Eastern Europe and Western Europe began putting increased 
emphasis on the development of nuclear power at about the same 
time. However, in East-Europe, this was not a result of the 
Arab oil embargo as much as it was due to the approaching 
depletion of oil fields in European Russia. Romania also, 
for the first time, conceded that its oil fields were being 
depleted. 

East Europeans look eastward towards the Soviet Union 
for their energy needs including nuclear technology. In 1977, 
Moscow announced that new nuclear power plants would be built 
in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in addition to those 
that are already operating or under construction. Poland and 
Romania would also be equipped with their first atomic reactors 

57 



as part of this new emphasis on nuclear energy. Under the 
present program, the Eastern bloc's share of nuclear produced 
energy is projected to rise from three percent of all electric 
energy to seven percent by 19 80. : ■■ Unlike the West, the 
Eastern European nations have no powerful antinuclear lobbies 
to contend with in making their plans for alternative energy 
sources . 

1. INTERATQMENSRGO 

The nuclear power programs of the Soviet-bloc Council 
for Mutual Economic Cooperation are now coordinated from a 
central agency. This agency "Interatomenergo" is carefully 
watched by xMoscow. In fact some Western analysts feel that 
a major reason why the Soviets are keeping Czechoslovakia 

under such close military and political control is its im- 

r i "5 q i 
portance as a prime source of uranium. " J 

The political pressures that have stalled the recent 

I.A.E.A. efforts to provide international control for their 

shared nuclear resources and technology do not exist in the 

East. For example, the East bloc has pooled its uranium 

resources, consisting of mines in Czechoslovakia, Poland and 

the Soviet Union. Some of the smaller East European countries 

build components for the joint reactor projects. Czechoslovakia 

furnishes high pressure vessels and Poland supplies steam 

[73:8] 
generators . 

The apparent ability of the East Europeans to cooperate 
to generate nuclear power is marred by the forces of national- 
ism and economics. The national forces that plague the Soviet 

58 



bloc have always existed, but the economic forces are new. 
For example, Paul Hoffman reported in another article entitled, 
"East Bloc Puts Increasing Emphasis on Nuclear Power," that "the 
smaller East European countries are under pressure to look for 
the alternative energy sources — mainly nuclear plants — because 
the Soviet Union clearly prefers to sell surplus oil and gas 
to hard currency nations. "^ * ^ This search for nuclear 
plants has caused the East Europeans to look to the export 
motivated nuclear industries of the West. 

2 . Romania 

One East European country taking an active interest in 

Western nuclear reactors — including the highly controversial 

T 2 3 • 8 1 

fast breeder type — is Romania. " J There are three reasons 

why Romania should be the first to initiate this cross-bloc 
request for nuclear technology. Under President Ceausescu, 
Romania has launched an industrial program to make Romania an 
economic leader in Eastern Europe by 1990. Secondly, Romania 
became the first Comecon country to establish direct relations 
with the EC in 1972. A third reason why Romania has led the 
others in this search for Western nuclear reactors was pre- 
sented by Malcolm Browne in his New York Times article, 
"Rumanian Trade—Troubled Growth:" 



Since Romania was granted most-favored-nation 
trading status (partly because it was considered 
to be allowing an acceptable number of Jews to 
emigrate) , it has also been eligible to import 
somewhat more American technology than the 
Soviet Union. L 23: 8 J 



59 



Furthermore, a new long-term agreement was signed by 
Romania and the U.S. in November of 1976 which provides for 
closer cooperation in economic, scientific, technological 
and industrial fields. * J 

Perhaps the most significant example of Romanian 
overtures towards economic cooperation with the West can be 
seen in the negotiations on nuclear coooperation which took 
place during 1977 between Canadian and Romanian officials. 
An agreement was signed between the two governments calling 

for "Cooperation in the Development and Application of Atomic 

r 2 5 • 124 1 
Energy Peaceful Purposes." 1 - " J The Canadian Department 

of External Affairs has said that this nuclear-safeguard 
agreement, signed October 24, 1977 in Ottawa, would lay the 
foundation for other agreements that are expected to lead to 
the purchase of Canadian nuclear technology and equipment by 
Romania . 

The prospect of Romania acquiring nuclear technology 
from Canada is significant to this thesis because it demon- 
strates the ability of the nuclear power issue to reflect 
current trends in international relations. For example, the 
Canadian government has also reported that: 



In addition to conducting the nuclear negotiations , 
Romanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, 
Constantin Stanciu, came to Ottawa in July for the 
annual trade consultations between the two countries. 
The Romanian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Vasile Gliga, visited Canada in October for consul--, 
tations on bilateral and multilateral issues . L 25 : 26 J 



While some Eastern European countries are more active particr 
pants in East-West dialogue than others, the implications of 

60 



the current cross-block negotiations can best be assessed from 
an historical perspective. 

3 . Roots of Dissension 

The historical foundation for the current relationship 
between Eastern Europe and the West starts with the rebuilding 
of Europe after World War II. Eastern Europe was unique in 
this process. Nations acquired new regimes and these regimes 
have been the subject of ideological dialogue ever since. 
Professor Steven Garrett, addressing a Naval Postgraduate 
School seminar in Soviet-European Affairs, commented that 
East Europe was looked upon as being the cause and symbol of 
the Cold War. The original post-war policy used by the West 

towards Eastern Europe was characterized by economic boycott, 

c 4. • [203] 

based on a rigid policy of containment. 

The Cold War struggle was as much economic as it was 

political. Two economically devastated areas were trying to 

rebuild using different and competing economic ideologies on 

opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. Steven Garrett has noted 

that in Western capitals it was hoped that the aggressive, 

expansionist actions by the Soviet Union would be hampered 

in that the Soviets would be forced to divert a share of their 

resources to help sustain Eastern Europe during the post-war 

f on 3 1 

rebuilding. J The political success of struggling 

Communist government in East Europe was hampered by their 
economic backwardness and the Western policy of economic non- 
cooperation with the Eastern European Communist governments 
which had been adopted as a weapon in the Cold War. The 

61 



ironic result of this policy has been to reinforce Eastern 
European economic dependency on, and hence political affinity 
with, the Soviet Union. 

Professor Vernon Aspaturian has characterized world 
politics during the Cold War as colonial in nature. Eastern 
Europe, then, was the object of great power diplomacy rather 
than an actor in it. J Today, however, a new policy is 
emerging towards Eastern Europe as a result of three important 
realizations. First, it was realized that an East-West boycott 
was self-defeating because of the natural European propinquity 
of markets and culture. Second, the use of the boycott as a 
weapon was derived from the tight bipolar political mind set 
which no longer applied. 

The third realization by the West was that the world 
was witnessing a revival in Eastern Europe of anti-Soviet 
nationalism. This nationalism was producing new centrifugal 
forces that were straining against the artificially imposed 
economic dependency on the Soviets. General Sir Harry Tuzo 
commented in a 1977 RUSI Journal that: 



Strains among competing Marxist centres are 
accompanied by increasing strains within 
them. Today in Eastern Europe, for example, 
we are observing the development of centrif- 
ugal pressures which are a product, among 
other things, of both suppressed nationalism 
and rising and unrequited socio-economic 
expectations. We cannot know in what way, ("171 -If! 
if at all, these pressures will seek release. 



It was felt that a revised Western economic policy of coopera- 
tion towards Eastern Europe would encourage these governments 
to decrease their economic ties to the Soviet Union. Thus, 

62 



new economic and diplomatic dialogues have resulted in new 
commercial exterprises . For example, concerning EEC- 
Yugoslavian relations, a top-level EEC delegation visited 
Belgrade in December 1976 and signed a solemn declaration 

with the Yugoslav government in which both sides promised to 

T 8 2 • 5 3 1 
"strengthen, deepen and diversify" their cooperation. 1 * J 

An article in The Economist reported that "There is hardly 

a Eurocrat in Brussels who does not want to help that plucky 

Balkan country keep its independence from Russia when Tito 

,,[82:53] 
goes . L J 

4 . Prospects for Change 

Today the world is witnessing a growing trend towards 
Eastern European self-sufficiency, both as a region and as 
individual states. As this self-sufficiency increases in 
direct proportion to increasing Western commercial participa- 
tion in Eastern Europe, it permits greater freedom for Eastern 
European governments to maneuver for future independence from 
Russie. Furthermore, it tends to shift the focus of Eastern 
European economic interests westward. An example of this 
trend is Ceausescu's announcement in 19 70 that Romania was 
prepared to enter into "joint-venture" arrangements with the 
West, as explained by Malcolm Browne: 

Romania, like a number of other Communist 
countries, has been particularly interested 
in developing "joint ventures" in which the 
host country and a foreign investor jointly 
operate a new corporation. They work out 
details of profit repatriation, corporate 
control, marketing patterns and so forth on 
a case-by-case basis. [23:8] 

63 



Nuclear energy, more than any other commercial venture, 
offers the greatest potential to achieve the goals of a liber- 
al East-West economic policy. In the first place, nuclear 
energy represents the single greatest commitment of technology, 
resources , capital and environmental considerations in return 
for the greatest potential to increase one's own industrial 
base. Secondly, it promises to solve the acute problems of 
energy dependency; the single most important factor that ties 
the East Europeans to the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the acqui- 
sition of nuclear technology promises to accelerate the trans- 
formation of East European LDC ' s (lesser developed countries) 
into major international actors, automatically making them 
members of the international network of uranium suppliers and 
consumers . 

As each Eastern European country achieves nuclear 
power status it will attain greater prominence within inter- 
national conferences such as the NPT and the Suppliers' Club. 
A more active role within these organizations will further 
benefit European economic development in two ways. First, 
the new nuclear powers will be viewed as favored clients or 
prospective customers to encourage them to become acculturated 
into Western European economic and political institutions. 
Aspaturian has observed that once Eastern Europeans become 

involved, their participation has accelerated their involve- 

, • [201] 
ment in Western consciousness and economic policy. 

The second advantage of participation in these inter- 
national conferences is that they provide a forum in which to 
voice individual nationally oriented foreign policies. The 

64 



NPT conference sessions, in particular, have recently provided 
such a forum. In the past these conferences have been a token 
arena dominated by the five nuclear weapon states. Today 
however, outspoken independent policy statements give evidence 
of the current revival of national consciousness in Eastern 
Europe. For example, Yugoslavia led the opposition against 
the inequities of the NPT treaty constraints when at the 
Review Conference (held in Geneva in May 1977) the delegation 
stated that Belgrade "would be reconsidering its attitude" 
toward the treaty because of its imbalance in favor of the 
nuclear powers. ' J This argument was continued in the 
recent press coverage of Colonel General Ivan Kukoc, member 
of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslavian League of 
Communist Central Committee Presidium: 



Yugoslavia is interested in the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes. In this sense 
we have been advising and are still advising 
against any monopoly which member countries of 
the so-called club of nuclear power are seeking 
to establish. [193:127] 



Colonel General Kukoc explicitly ties Yugoslavian 
security concerns to the activities of the Suppliers' Club 

and warns that the government will continue to resist efforts 

[193 • 127] 
by the nuclear states to establish a nuclear monopoly. 

Whereas Eastern European countries pursue separate 

economic policies, successful involvement with the West by 

a few of these burgeoning nuclear power nations will encourage 

other countries which are not dependent on the Soviet Union to 

begin to maneuver on their own. Thus, East-West dialogue over 

65 



the nuclear power questions fosters the possibility of new 
ideological cooperation at a time when political forces of 
nationalism in the East combine with Eurocommunism in the 
West to erode Soviet hegemony. 

Building new bridges of trade and diplomacy in the 
spirit of dentente has defined the present policy of trans- 
European commercial relations. This new European economic 
reapproachment should appeal both to Eastern and Western 
Europeans for the following three reasons: 

1. European industries are able to operate outside 
the superpowers' spheres of influence. 

2. East-West cooperation achieves economic independ- 
ence from bipolar political constraints. 

3. Trans-European cooperation insures that European 
commercial interests will remain under European 
controls . 

Whereas present East-West European economic policies 
have evolved from artificially imposed Cold War politics, 
the future policies promise to reflect individual national 
priorities. Many Eastern European countries seek to raise 
their own technical competence through new ventures in 
Western technology such as nuclear power. Eventually these 
rapidly industrializing nations will be entering the lucrative 
nuclear technology market as commercially viable producers. 
Their goal will then be to transition as rapidly as possible 
from consumer to supplier. Thus the nuclear age offers to 
East Europeans as well as to West Europeans a means for 
political self-expression and commercial enterprise. 

66 



Chances for East-West economic entrepreneurship , 
especially between the EC and the Comecon, never looked 
better. The September 18, 1977, meeting in Brussels resumed 
the long drawn out dialogue between the two European trading 
blocs illustrating the principles of trans-European economic 
af inity . 

The eastern Comecon countries are not just hoping for 
political benefits from closer ties with the EC, but are also 
looking for concessions in their exports to the community. 
These concessions include easier credit, the harmonization of 
some quantitative restrictions and the adaptation of the 

common agricultural policy to allow more East European farm 

f 12 • 52 1 

products into the EC. " J The Economist reports that: 



Two thirds of Yugoslavia's exports to the 
community are industrial goods, so high- 
technology imports can be justified as 
sharpening the countries' competitive edge 
in Western markets. Yugoslavia already has 
about 170 joint venture agreements and around 
500 industrial co-operation agreements with 
western firms, many of them in West Germany. 
It is now changing its legislation to attract 
more foreign investors . [12 : 52] 



5 . European Detente 

The current developments in trans-European economic 
relationships evolved during the past thirty years from a 

political process described by Gregory Flynn in an article 

[47 • 401 1 
for Qrbis as the "content of European detente." 1 - J This 

description divides the evolution of European detente into 

two stages: the 1969-1972 West German Qstpolitik followed by 



67 



a second period of East-West negotiations from 1972-1975 
aimed at attaining : 

"a mutually acceptable set of rules to govern 
competitive but peaceful coexistence, and to 
explore possibilities for reducing the role of 
military confrontation in the East-West rela- 
tionship. "L 47 • 4 i°T 

Since 1975 a new era of East-West detente exists based 
on economic goals rather than political goals. These economic 
goals are shared by both East and West Europeans. One promi- 
nent example of this new era of cross-bloc commercialism is 
the rapidly expanding trans-European nuclear power industry. 

The long standing obstacles that have postponed 
progress towards diplomatic and socio-economic cooperation 
between East and West Europeans are rapidly disappearing. 
Hastening the reconciliation process is the mutual desire 
to achieve energy sufficiency, economic independence and 
commercial advantages inherent in a strong nuclear power in- 
dustry. This section of this chapter has examined the forces 
that brought East-West relations to the threshold of a trans- 
European economic order. The next section will consider the 
prospects of the nuclear power industry reaching Euro-continental 
proportions. The major obstacle is the political forces 
affecting East-West European relations in light of the binding 
influence of nuclear power. 

E. POLITICAL FORCES AFFECTING TRANS -EUROPEAN UNITY 

There are two versions of Communism in Europe today. First 

there is the familiar Marxist-Leninist Moscow-sponsored variety 

68 



and then there is a new kind which adapts the realpolitik 
principals of the Western capitalists. The Moscow version 
has failed to keep up with the national, economic and 
political forces in both Eastern and Western Europe, and so 
it has receded in the face of a more viable political alter- 
native. The most recent form of Communism allows the forces 
of nationalism and Western-style commercialism to exist in a 
more tolerant and more realistic framework of government 
than would be possible under Soviet Communism. Marxist- 
Socialist radicalism which threatened to destroy the hard- 
earned successes of capitalism has given way to a new willing- 
ness to cooperate with Western democratic institutions to 
achieve national benefits. The benefits of political health 
through commercial wealth derived from a strong industrial 
economy are now the expressed principles of the Communist 
parties of Tito, Berlinguer, and Ceausescu. 

Often the characteristics of the emerging Eurocommunist 
parties are the "out-of-power versions" of their Eastern 
cousins in power in Yugoslavia and Romania. The current 
dialogue between these similar political entities has led to 
increased cooperation between the Eastern Communists and the 
non-Communist coalitions currently in control of the Western 
governments. This cooperation is a result of the influence 
and public support that the minority Western Communists 
command, an influence illustrated by the fact that the 
programs offered by the Italian Communists for the solutions 
to Italy's economic dilemma are often acted upon by the 
Christian Democrats. Furthermore, the Euro communists facilitate 

69 



communication between the West and the East. The result has 
been a climate for East-West conciliation which exists sepa- 
rate and apart from superpower influence. 

The French and Italian Communist Parties have recently 
exhibited their intentions to preserve rather than to replace 
certain aspects of their national system in spite of the basic 
tenants of Communist philosophy. For example, the Italian 
Communists have stated that it is their intention to leave the 
Ferrari plant in Turin out of their plan to nationalize the 
industries , acknowledging that this exceptional product con- 
tributes favorably to the national image and prestige of the 
Italian people. 

The French Communist Party under iMarchais has made similar 
concessions to the existing French economic and political 
structure. Marchais recently announced that the Communists 
have decided to drop their opposition to the French nuclear 
strike force, the "Force de Frappe," acknowledging that the 
"Tous Azimuts" defense policy of omni-directional targeting is 
the only true way to French military independence. Not only 
do the French Communists voice strong views in favor of the 
maintenance of an independent atomic military force, but they 
also echo the government's arguments in favor of the nuclear 
energy program. Through their labor federation, the Communists 
have lashed out at opponents of nuclear energy as partisans 
"of a return to the days of sailboat navies and oil lamps." L 

The conclusion one might draw in examining the tendencies 
exhibited thus far by these two Eurocommunist parties is that, 
should they attain full control of their governments, the 

70 



changes that might be made would not directly threaten each 
government's participation in the present nuclear power con- 
sortium. One could also expect to see these governments 
attentive to the same issues that motivate the more liberal 
and progressive Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Thus, 
the encroaching specter of modern Communism, exemplified by 
the Eurocommunists and certain Eastern European regimes, is 
far less likely to disrupt the new European economic order 
than would the Moscow version. How much and in what way the 
European economy might be affected will be examined next. 

The advent of Communist control in France and Italy would 
have one of two possible effects on the trans-European inte- 
gration of the nuclear power industry. On the one hand, 
Communist governments in both East and West Europe would be 
dealing without the ideological stigmas and political compe- 
tition that impedes cross-blow cooperation today. This new 
advantage could accelerate the forming of a European nuclear 
power industry cartel. This could transform several minor 
actors into a single new actor of economic and political 
superpower stature. 

A second consideration is the systemic effect that a 
superpotent trans-European nuclear power industry cartel 
would have on the U.S., Soviet Union and Third World. What- 
ever action is taken by the two superpowers to prevent nuclear 
weapons proliferation will be minimal compared to the reaction 
of the Third World. Most LDC's would again have to face the 
realization that they may be trading "petro dependency" for 
another type of energy dependence; a nuclear dependency on a 

71 



commercially united Europe. As long as individual East-West 
European competition keeps the price of nuclear power export 
and services down, the non-European countries will pay the 
price. However, the forces opposing a trans-European 
commercial advantage would lend support to political forces 
in Europe trying to prevent this union. 

Regardless of the advantages which future Communist govern- 
ments may have to better integrate the economies of the separate 
European states, there is one inescapable conclusion. The 
enormous potential power of the nuclear power industry to 
generate political, economic and social forces on the European 
continent is significant. Therefore, one of the more useful 
indicators of the developing relationships between Eastern 
and Western Europeans is a study of the expansion of the 
nuclear power industry. 



F. CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AS AN ANALYTICAL 
TOOL 



Developing a nuclear power industry for Europeans by 
Europeans, and in spite of Europeans has proven to be a 
monumental undertaking. As this industry develops, it 
contacts and interacts with the many forces that are used 
to describe and define East-West and European relations. 
The forces of nationalism, commercialism, diplomacy, 
dependency, ecology and politics have all been identified as 
providing both the allies and antagonists, proponents and 
opponents, slaves and masters of the rapidly expanding 
nuclear power industry. 

72 



Chapter II has examined European relationships in four 
settings. First it looked within the major industrial states 
of Western Europe. Next it compared the national programs 
that were interrelated in Western European cooperative commer- 
cial ventures. These programs were then examined for their 
ability to cooperate within the context of the European 
Community. Thirdly, the integrated nuclear industrial programs 
that unite the participating nations of Eastern Europe were 
explored in light of the growing commercial detente between 
East and West. Finally, the political forces in Europe were 
projected against the prospects for a trans-European nuclear 
union to forecast the future of nuclear energy should the 
Communist party come to power. 

The broad conceptual framework of the nuclear perspective 
has served to identify some of the major forces that surface 
as each European nation exercises its nuclear options. These 
forces affect the ability of the nuclear power industries to 
thrive or to just barely survive and can be monitored in the 
public debates and budget cuts that measure both public and 
official opinions. The political analyst, observing the 
expansion and contraction of the nuclear power industry as it 
responds to the forces it attracts, will gain some insight 
into these forces and how they affect European relations . 
Thus the nuclear power industry becomes a measure of the fusion 
and fission of inter-European relations. 

Having identified the analytical role of nuclear power in 
a global and continental context, this thesis is now ready to 
turn its focus to the national perspective. 

73 



III. THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AND FOREIGN POLICY 

This chapter will explore the role of nuclear energy in 
international relations from the national perspective. 
Political analysts can gain insight into the motives behind 
certain foreign policy decisions made by a nation by account- 
ing for that country's nuclear power policies and goals. 
Evidence will be presented to show that the nuclear power 
questions that arise in the daily political life of a country 
closely parallel that country's foreign policy debates. The 
analytical technique introduced in Chapter I was used to study 
the nuclear power policy and debates to determine international 
trends of economic and political cooperation and conflict. 
The national perspective which is about to be presented, will 
show how a single nation can be examined for these same 
elements of cooperation and conflict. 

National elements of cooperation and conflict do not exist 
because of the international cooperation and conflict generated 
by nations seeking energy solutions on a global scale. Neither 
do they exist because of trends toward economic cooperation on 
a continental scale as seen in Chapter II. Instead, national 
elements are derived from social, political, and economic 
elements from within that national society. National elements 
can be distinguished from the others, for the purpose of this 
analysis, in their ability to identify that nation as unique 
among all others. Therefore, a national perspective is necessary 

74 



in nuclear analysis so as not to overlook other elements of 
cooperation and conflict that determine a nation's role in 
international relations. 

The next chapter will introduce the technique of using 
nuclear power analysis to help determine the current trends 
of a nation's foreign policy. Before proceeding, however, it 
will be beneficial to briefly summarize the steps covered 
thus far in the research design and then to relate these 
steps to the overall thesis objective, i.e., to examine the 
analytical role of nuclear energy in contemporary interna- 
tional relations. 

Chapter I has described from a global perspective evidence 
that new systemic effects are produced by a world reorienting 
itself to a nuclear-dependent economy. These effects are 
caused by a worldwide international infrastructure that exists 
as a result of suppliers and consumers engaging in the trade 
of uranium supplies and nuclear power technology. 

Chapter II has presented an analysis of the nuclear power 
industry's effect on European relations. Nuclear power has 
acted as a source of conflict and cooperation between the 
industrial nations of Europe. In particular, nuclear power 
industries have influenced the trend towards Pan-European 
commercial integration. 

The next logical step is to narrow the perspective of 
nuclear power analysis to a single nation. The purpose of 
this step is to determine to what extent nuclear power 
reflects the major trends of a nation's foreign policy. 



75 



The analysis is thus refined by starting with the global 
perspective (the influence of nuclear power worldwide) , re- 
focusing this nuclear "power" perspective on a particular 
continent, and then on one particular nation. In this way, 
the ability of nuclear power analysis to predict foreign 
policy will be brought into sharp focus. This nuclear-based 
analytical framework allows the observer to assess a nuclear- 
related event (as defined in Chapter I) for ancillary conse- 
quences on continental, global, and national levels. 

The modern French nation with its advanced nuclear power 
industry will serve to illustrate the technique of nuclear 
power analysis from the national perspective. The French 
nuclear power export industry is especially useful as a clear 
example of how one nation is adapting foreign policy to cope 
with an emerging nuclear-based economic order. 

An examination of French foreign policy vis-a-vis nuclear 
policy will produce evidence to show that nuclear power exists 
as an instrument of foreign policy in international relations. 
This principle will be presented as follows: The French arms 
trade as it existed in the past decade was used as a major 
instrument of French foreign policy, enabling France to 
maintain its political, economic, and military independence. 
The French arms trade of the past decade will be compared to 
the French nuclear power export industry as it exists today. 
This comparison will be made by highlighting the similarities 
and differences between "arms transfers" and "nuclear exports," 
in terms of policies, procedures, and objectives. The intent 
of this comparison is to argue that the French have transformed 

76 



a highly diversified nuclear power export trade into a major 
instrument of French foreign policy. Establishing this 
parallel will enable the political analyst to relate the 
current French nuclear policy to the role of French arms 
transfer policies in the recent past. 

The predictive ability of this comparative technique stems 
from the use of historical parallels. For example, if the 
question to be determined is whether or not France will 
transfer controversial technology to a pariah state in the 
future, the odds are they will. This prediction is based on 
the fact that both French arms transfer policies and nuclear 
power export policies have consistently shown this to be the 
practice . 

The question now arises, how close are nuclear power 
policies and arms transfer policies to the mainstream of 
French foreign policy? The following chapter will show that 
the French have actually utilized both nuclear and arms 
technology transfers as major instruments of French foreign 
policy. Therefore, the use of nuclear power analysis is 
indispensable to the French political analyst. 

Nuclear power has received greater emphasis in France 
than in any other industrialized country in Europe. France 
exploded its first atom bomb in the Sahara on 13 February, 

1960 and Charles de Gaulle announced that France was 

T 19 1 • 5 3 1 
"stronger and prouder since [that] morning. " L 

De Gaulle sought to restore the position of France in inter- 
national affairs by launching upon an independent course as 
leader of the "Third World" of countries aligned neither with 

77 



the Western Allies nor the Soviet bloc. The development of 
an "independent" French nuclear strike force gave evidence 
of a French desire to remain independent of U.S. or Soviet 
controlled defense pacts. France had become after 1965 the 
world's third most important arms exporter. It was clear 
that an aggressive arms transfer program was part of De Gaulle's 
foreign policy to extend French influence into the Middle East 
and Africa. When French arms sales showed signs of slackening 
after more than a decade of success, the French turned to 
their highly developed nuclear power industry for new sources 
of exports. 

By 1975 nuclear power had become international. Thirty 
countries, in addition to the five nuclear weapons states, 
had nuclear power plants in operation, under construction, or 
on order. " J Today there exists a highly competitive 
international commerce in reactors, uranium (natural and 
enriched) , and the various supporting equipment and services. 
The principal suppliers in addition to France and the two 

superpowers are West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, 

a c 4.1, a^ • [161:6] 
Japan, and South Africa. 

The price of nuclear exports is staggering. The cost of 

a standard-sized power plant in the U.S. for example, is 

about a billion dollars. The world-wide reactor business 

will involve several hundred billions of dollars in contracts 

a [191:59] 

over the next two decades. 

France has entered this market as the foremost promoter 

I" 1 ic . g "I 

of the controversial "fast breeder" reactor." J This 
reactor produces more fuel than it consumes. Unfortunately, 

73 



the fuel can be used in atomic weapons . This characteristic 
has made the fast breeder reactor a target of President 
Carter's non-proliferation policy. Despite diplomatic 
pressure, France continues to pursue an aggressive nuclear 
export policy in a style strongly reminiscent of French arms 
transfer policies of the previous decade. Is this pattern 
purely coincidental or has France adapted its successful arms 
marketing techniques to the nuclear export trade? This thesis 
will investigate this question. 

The next section of this chapter will describe the French 
arms transfer policy of the past decade and the reasons for 
the success and then its temporary recession. The reasons for 
the dramatic shift in emphasis to nuclear power export 
development will be explained in terms of the growing demand 
for this new energy source in the Third World. 

Section B will introduce the hypothesis that the parallel 
patterns of the policies, procedures and events that occur in 
both the French arms trade and the recent nuclear export 
trade show that the French have superimposed their distinct 
arms transfer style over the policies that govern and promote 
the nuclear export program. 

Section C will identify the major foreign policy goals 
of the French government. These national objectives will be 
compared to the major goals of the French nuclear power in- 
dustry to illustrate the value of using a nuclear power- 
oriented approach for a political analysis of France. Section 
D will extend the nuclear-oriented analysis to contemporary 

domestic politics. 

79 



A. THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO DWINDLING ARMS SALES IS NUCLEAR 

The ability of France to compete successfully in the 
lucrative nuclear power generating export trade stems from 
the French experience as a major arms supplier during the 
60 's. This chapter will review that decade in the following 
areas : 

1. The reasons why the French were successful in the 
arms trade; 

2. Unique French sociopolitical advantages; 

3. Why, despite these advantages, the French started to 
lose their competitiveness in the arms trade. 

The chapter will also present two explanations for the French 
entering the nuclear power export market in the Third World. 
The intent of this chapter is to show how the French arms 
trading experience made it possible for the French to capi- 
talize on the Third World's demand for nuclear technology. 

1 . Reasons for Success 

France enjoyed a profitable arms trade during the 
60' s and early 70' s, relatively free from superpower competi- 
tion. Harkarvy describes France during this period as "the 
jackal state of the arms trade, banking on a commercial 
policy to intrude into markets held previously by either of 
the superpowers, and often becoming a preferred supplier for 
nations not willing to tie themselves either to the American 
or the Soviet orbits. J Thus, France was able to supply 
arms competitively. There are several reasons for this 

phenomenon : 

80 



1. The US was engaged in the Vietnam War until 1973. 

2. The USSR was on a massive rearmament program of 
its own. 

3. The weapons being produced by both superpowers 
during the past decade were designed to fit their 
particular defense programs--in the case of the 
US, jungle warfare, and for the USSR, strategic 
offense and defense. Therefore, the French were 
able to tailor their industries and market the 
armaments sought by the emerging Third World 
countries . 

4. The US and USSR had agreed upon the non-proliferation 
issues which enabled the non-allied French to market 
arms free of diplomatic constraints and superpower 
competition . 

Consequently, in the past decade French arms were not only 
competitive, but were also politically and ideologically free. 
Coupled with these French advantages was the fact that 
a burgeoning arms market was waiting to be exploited by the 
opportunistic French. This market became available for the 
following reasons: 

1. The Third World became endowed with disposable 
income from resource exports to industrialized 
nations . 

2. Several Third World countries were engaged in 
regional conflicts. 

3. Several countries were situated between armed 
camps and hostile neighbors. These countries 

81 



sought arms for defense due to unstable political 
climates . 

4. Lesser developed countries (LDC's) were trying to 
burst out of their technologically backwards con- 
dition. Sophisticated arms created the image of 
technological advancement and contributed to their 
own technological base . 

5 . Third World countries favored French arms as a 
symbol of their independence from major power 
bloc politics. 

For these and other reasons, the French were able to enjoy 

for over a decade a period of economic success as arms traders. 

During this period France received all the benefits of 
commercial success, including not only international prestige, 
but also, in the case of French domestic politics, it guaran- 
teed the administration widespread popular support. All this 
industrial productivity took place during a time when France 
was building up its own independent arsenals. The export 
trade helped finance the nuclear "force de f rappe . " It off- 
set conventional weapon R&D for the French military and insured 
that the defense production line would stay open to support 
French forces at home and abroad. 

France gained some influence by sending economic 
assistance personnel to the LDC's only with the weapons for 
service and training. This technique of personal interaction 
was not unlike the French colonial policy which was designed 
to spread French culture through education and language. 
The French arms policy during this time was a socio-political 

82 



policy designed to regain the "grandeur that was France,"'- ■" 
a policy served by the reputation France gained as a major 
supplier of front line, high technology weapons systems. 
Obviously, France had more than just sales to lose when the 
two superpowers reentered the market in that watershed year 
of 1973. 

2 . Reasons for Decline 

Several events that occurred in 19 7 3 caused the French 
to reexamine their dwindling arms trade market and to begin 
to search for commercially viable alternatives. French mili- 
tary orders began to ebb more rapidly after the 19 7 3 Middle 
East embargo, having already fallen drastically from $670 
million to $315 million in 1969. L 152:259 J T h e us was a fcie to 
introduce new aircraft of the caliber of the F-14, F-15 and 
F-16 and to transfer Vietnam War surplus aircraft like OV-10's 
and C-130's which further hastened the demise of the French 
arms trade. About the same time the Soviets were introducing 
high-performance aircraft like the MiG-25 to the Middle East 
theater which humiliated the air defenses equipped with 
French supplied arms. French market leverage was being under- 
cut by its former clients as in the case of Israel's attempt 
to transfer French Mirages to Venezuela. Even more humiliat- 
ing was the introduction of the Israeli Kfir fighter, made 
competitive by the Israeli engineers from the stolen French 
Mirage design. 

All these events forced the French to reexamine their 
arms transfer policies. To prevent the economic collapse of 

83 



their industries that depended so heavily on the arms trade, 
the French did two things. First, they diverted their aero- 
space and armaments industries into multi-national corpora- 
tions, combining resources, labor, technology and international 
sales networks with those of their European partners. Second- 
ly, the French sought to avert economic recession by entering 
into competition with the US and USSR in exporting the rapidly 
developing nuclear power technology. 

In the past, only the US and Canada had the necessary 
uranium fuels to exercise control and influence over the sale 
of nuclear technology. Without the fuel, the technology 
bought by an LDC was short-lived. Furthermore, this depend- 
ency on foreign sources of nuclear fuel inhibited the con- 
struction of nuclear reactors in the LDC ' s . This "fuel 
dependency" was made painfully obvious during the oil embargo 
of 1973. 

Two things happened which allowed nuclear power pro- 
duction to become economically and politically desirable. 
First, the energy scarcity tended to silence the opponents 
of nuclear power production. Arguments made by environ- 
mentalists that impeded earlier nuclear technology develop- 
ment in the 60' s were blunted by the safety records compiled 
by second generation reactors in the 70 's. 

Secondly, the new generation fast breeder reactors, 
reproducing their own fuel, freed the perspective recipients 
from the entanglements of uranium dependency. Several in- 
dustrial countries stepped in to take advantage of the new 
opportunities to break the superpower monopoly. Of all the 

84 



countries that entered the nuclear power production market, 
France was the most committed. 

3 . French Nuclear Advantage 

France enjoyed certain unique advantages that permitted 
the French nuclear reactor industry to exploit this burgeoning 
export market: 

1. France did not sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
and thus her industry was not restricted from 
testing and improving upon Western nuclear 
technology . 

2 . France had developed and maintained its own 
nuclear strike force. This provided government 
support for nuclear research in terms of money 
and facilities. 

3. France had developed nuclear-powered submarines 
which required the same specialized research 
program which had helped the US industries 
produce their commercial reactor technology. 

4. France did not sign the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in 1968, and therefore was not restricted 

by treaty inspections and sanctions . France had 

free reign of the full range of the world's 

4.- i i i 4. [191:58] 
potential nuclear market. 

5. France embarked upon its nuclear sales campaign 
as an established supplier with sales connections 
which had been developed during the past decade 
through French arms sales. 

85 



6. France had spent a full decade since limiting its 
military participation in the NATO alliance by 
establishing itself as a neutral, non-ideological 
supplier. France was looked upon by the emerging 
Third World as a successful example of how a 
country could survive and even thrive outside the 
bipolar bloc structure. France, therefore, was 

a symbol of " polycentrism" L - 1 which increased 
its affinity to the developing countries. 

7. France had benefited from its experience in the 
60 's of being able to "deal with wild cards" in 
a two-handed arms game between the US and USSR. 
France had been able to capitalize on the markets 
left unattended by the two superpowers. This 
same gray market, i.e., embargoed nations, pariah 
states, etc., was not unfamiliar territory to the 
French exporting industries. 

8. Another reason France was able to compete with the 
superpowers in the nuclear trade was the effective 
role France played in the European Economic 
Community. Joint nuclear production and the sharing 
of European technology and resources, particularly 
with West Germany made the French nuclear reactor 
industry highly competitive. 

4 . Search for Markets 

There are two reasons why France can now implement 
these unique advantages in a successful campaign to exploit 

86 



the world's nuclear technology markets. First, President 
Carter has halted US fast breeder reactor production because 
the weapons grade plutonium produced by these reactors could 
fall into the hands of terrorists. This gives the go ahead 
signal for the French to capitalize on cancelled US contracts. 
Dr. Demitri Simes has said, "The arms race was one-sided--the 
Soviets were racing to catch up and the US was busy reducing — 
it is easy to win an arms race of this nature." 1 - -* This 
one-sided arms race principle can be applied to the French 
nuclear power industry. The French began putting all their 
industrial strength, marketing analysis and commercial experi- 
ence behind nuclear energy sales and service at a time when 
the US was putting political restraints on its own nuclear 
industry and diplomatic restraints on all other nuclear 
suppliers. It was easy for the French to win in an energy race 
of this nature. 

The second reason why the time is propitious for 
French commercialism is that the Third World is emerging in 
their cultural and industrial evolution ripe for a new energy 
source. The fact that some LDC ' s are considered by the US 
State Department to receive high technology weapons like the 
F-15 shows their increasing technological capacity . 

The following is a list of the reasons why the Third 
World is motivated to acquire nuclear technology. These 
reasons are strikingly similar to the Third World's reasons 
for acquiring arms. Nuclear power production is said to: 

1. Offer a quick fix that frees the LDC from external 
energy dependency and political constraints; 

87 



2. Promote rapid economic development; 

3. Create a favorable balance of payments; 

4. Establish new markets for the LDC ' s rapidly 
expanding export industries; 

5. Insure a major power interest in protecting the 
LDC's during regional conflicts (one factor 
working against French reactor sales) ; 

6. Increase the indigenous technological base; 

7. Increase domestic security through its ability to 
enhance popular support for the existing regime; 

8. Increase external security by tacitly projecting 
the image of being able to divert fuel into 
weapons production during international conflicts; 

9. Project big power prestige and status as a member 
of the "nuclear power club;" 1 - * J 

10. Convert windfall profits earned in oil economies 
into social welfare improvement projects (Wide- 
spread deployment of nuclear-produced electricity 
is seen by oil rich nations as returning the 
greatest benefits to quell rural unrest by 
diverting public consciousness from the unequal 
distribution of wealth.); 

11. Counter the image gained by neighboring rivals to 
avert regional hegemony (Brazil and Argentina, 
Pakistan and India, Iran and Iraq, etc.) . 

The United States and Soviet alignment on the fast 
breeder reactor non-proliferation issue coupled with a rising 



88 



demand have caused the nuclear reactor market to suddenly 
expand beyond the abilities of the US and USSR to supply the 
demand. The French, with their socio-political advantages 
and their ambitious program to offset declining arms sales, 
have embarked on a successful nuclear power export program 

with multi-billion dollar contracts extending through the 

a * *.u 4. [191:59] 

end of the century. J 

This section has provided the reasons why the French 

have entered the nuclear technology export market following 

a decade of prominence as an arms supplier. The next chapter 

will present evidence to show that the French have patterned 

their nuclear reactor export policies by superimposing their 

established arms transfer policies. 

B. ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES AND NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES 

1 . Presenting the Evidence 

HYPOTHESIS: IF... French arms transfer policies, pro- 
cedures, and events closely parallel the 
present policies, procedures and events 
that occur in the French nuclear power 
equipment export trade ... .Then ... the 
French have adapted their successful 
pattern of arms transfers to the nuclear 
reactor export program. 

METHODOLOGY: This chapter will present the results of 
an examination that compared French arms 



89 



transfer patterns to French nuclear 
reactor sales patterns . The categories 
which have been studied include but are 
not limited to political, economic, 
bureaucratic, military, and diplomatic 
procedures and events. During the course 
of the content analysis, certain public 
statements surfaced and are included for 
their description of the international 
systemic effect that French arms transfers 
have in common with French reactor sales. 

CORRELATION 

VARIABLES: SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World , 

19 71, was used to collect twenty-eight statements that describe 

the French arms transfer policies, procedures and events that 

characterized the French successes and failures during the 

F 1 6 2 1 
1960-1971 era. These statements will be compared to 

published accounts of the present day French nuclear power 

production export transactions. The intent of this comparison 

is to identify the distinguishing characteristics of both 

policies and to highlight their similarities or differences. 

FORMAT: When parallel columns are used, the arms 
transfer comments will appear on the left-hand side and the 
nuclear transactions on the right. This list will be repeated 
in summary form at the end of this section. The conclusions 
drawn from this comparison will demonstrate the validity of 
the proposed hypothesis. 



90 



2 . Historical Parallel Patterns 

The following examples of arms transfer patterns and 
nuclear technology transfer patterns demonstrate the French 
policy to operate independently from Western diplomatic 
restraints . 



Arms 

After the US imposed an 
embargo on India and 
Pakistan in September 1965, 



France sold Mirages and 



submarines to Pakistan. 



[162:249] 



Nuclear Power 

Although the US and Canada 
has imposed a Uranium embargo 
on the EEC to emphasize non- 
proliferation concerns, France 
sold Pakistan a controversial 
reactor. ^^ 



These two episodes helped France maintain its image as a major 
independent actor. 

The following examples show the French willingness to 
sell to "pariah states" despite diplomatic pressure on the non- 
proliferation of arms and nuclear technology. 



Arms 

In August 1963, the UN 
Security Council resolution 
called for an arms embargo 
on South Africa. France 
abstained and became the 
main supplier of arms to 
the tune of $170 million, 
roughly 45% of South 
Africa's total major arms 
imports from 1961-1969. 1- 162:268 -1 



Nuclear Power 

France did not sign the nu- 
clear non-proliferation treaty 
of 1968 , and has since become 
the foremost supplier of the 
controversial fast breeder 
reactor. "Pariah states" like 
South Africa and Pakistan are 
on the list to get French fast 
breeder technology in spite of 
international adversion. ' ' - 1 



91 



The commercial benefits of these controversial export policies 
are clear. France has taken advantage of the so-called "gray 
market" for arms and nuclear fast breeder reactors with few 
competitors. This "laissez faire" export policy for both arms 
and nuclear reactors has brought political pressure from the 

United States in an attempt to prevent deliveries of certain 

. [57:8] 
equipment. L J 



Arms 

When the US attempted to 

discourage Latin American 

countries from buying 

sophisticated weapons, 

France demonstrated its 

readiness to supply tanks 

and supersonic aircraft. - 1 



Nuclear Power 

The US State Department is 
offering A-7 aircraft to 
Pakistan in return for that 
country's agreement to pull 
out of a deal with the 

French for a nuclear re- 

. . [155:2] 
processing plant. L 



The French government actively promotes exports which cater 
to the developing countries . 



Arms 

The French have emphasized 
the sale of weapons to de- 
veloping countries. The 
1967 and 1969 exhibitions 
were held at Satory with 

special arms displays for 

, . . . . [162:254] 

developing countries. 



Nuclear Power 

The French favor a maximum 
development of their nuclear 
equipment industries, and a 
strong contribution of these 
industries to their exports 
and their entree as develop- 
ers into third-world 

. ■ [117:75] 
countries . L 



French exports are tailored to meet foreign market require- 
ments . 



92 



Arms 



Nuclear Power 



The French government has 
placed emphasis on the 
design of military equip- 
ment to meet foreign re- 
quirements. The Mirage 5 
has been specially designed 
for the third-world 



market. 



[162:254] 



To achieve its goal, Pakistan 
bought a French reactor that 

did not depend on foreign re- 

w. [78:13] 

processing. L J 

Also, the French have announced 

a new nuclear fuel process that 

does not produce the weapons 

grade plutonium. Thus it is 

designed to overcome current 

non-proliferation restraints 

on the export of the fast 

breeder reactor . 



The French have never been shy about their export objectives 
The following examples illustrate the French style of taking 
advantage of opportunistic situations in both arms sales and 
reactor sales. 



Arms 

When the British imposed 
an embargo on South Africa 
in 1964 , France exploited 
the embargo to become the 

principal supplier to that 

_ . [162:249] 
country . 



Nuclear Power 

General Electric was the 
front-runner to supply 
South Africa with a nu- 
clear reactor. However, 
France "streaked past 
when an embarrassed Re- 
publican Administration 
indicated it would prefer 

the contract to go to a 

*• ..[8:78] 
non-American firm. L 

A similar deal was con- 
cluded between France and 
Iran while American re- 
actor orders were stalled 

• A k 4- [8:76] 
in debate . 



93 



Illustrating that French opportunism is still alive, 
the French "snapped up" the vacant space to mount a national 
exhibit" at the British Farnborough Air Show after the US 
Department of Commerce did not take up its option on 25,000 
square feet. "A sign of the times," says Aviation Week . *- 1:13 -1 

SIPRI concludes that "French actions can best be 

described as those of a country seeking the best available 

1*162 -2491 
markets without strong political restraints ." L ' J 

Although SIPRI was describing French arms transfer policies, 

the following account of a recent Franco-Japanese nuclear 

reprocessing contract shows the same pattern of opportunism 

without strong political restraint: The Japanese got tired 

of waiting for the lengthy procedures of a British public 

inquiry into a proposed joint venture with France and Britain 

to recycle spent fuel so they pressed on ahead with the French 

[*146 • 84 1 
half of the deal first. " J The pattern is clear. The 

French political climate does not restrain the French from 

taking advantage of other countries 1 political constraints. 

Government support for exports in France can be seen in the 

following examples of the parallel patterns of arms and 

nuclear transfers. 

Arms Nuclear Power 

A large part of French The French nuclear engineer- 
armaments industry is ing firm, Framatome, is now 
government owned. The owned by the government's 
biggest exceptions are Atomic Energy Commission. 
Dassault and Breguet Together with Alsthom and 
which merged in 1967. the Compagnie Electro- 
There is close cooperation Mecanique, it forms the 

94 



between private and na- 
tional firms and the sales 
of weapons are strictly 
supervised. The Direction 
des Affairs Internales is 
primarily responsible for 
the promotion of weapon 
exports on the government's 



behalf 



[162:252] 



French industrial group 

that goes out for export 

orders. Close government 

supervision is provided 

by the semi-autonomous 

Atomic Energy Commission 

which plays an active role 

in the initiation of export 
dBala .[U7s7S] 



This illustrates that the French have adopted their successful 
arms transfer practices of "government ownership," "close 
cooperation and supervision," and an "active role in promoting 
exports" to help the nuclear export industry prosper in the 
70's. President Giscard d'Estaing emphasized the French 

government's support for nuclear exports when he chose to head 

*.u u • u- i * [127:53] 

up a committee on the subject himself. 

One reason for close government cooperation with its 

arms industry and nuclear industry is the role exports play 

in maintaining the defense industry as illustrated in the 

following parallel examples. 



Arms 

Arms exports are central 
to the French defense in- 
dustry: the growth of the 
industry has been closely 
associated with the growth 
of its exports. The role 
played by exports in main- 
taining the French defense 

industry has been stressed 

. , . , [162:257] 
publicly . 



Nuclear Power 

French exports of nuclear 
power plants serve the 
defense industry in several 
ways. The capital intensive 
domestic development of both 
military and commercial uses 
of nuclear energy are financed 
in part by exports. Prime 
Minister Barre has stressed 
exports above the problem of 
unemployment as a primary 
government objective.[207:PK2] 



95 



The arms industry and the nuclear power industry benefit from 
export policies that help to defray the enormous research and 
development costs. The French elected to develop their own 

nuclear weapons in the early 60' s and now have a larger research 

r o "7 • 1 1 "i 
reactor than the US. '* J The export of the nuclear tech- 
nology which was derived from this defense research and develop- 
ment has enabled the French to defray much of the R&D costs. 
The practice of using exports to defray the R&D costs is a 
recurring principle in French Arms transfer policies. To wit: 

Arms Nuclear Power 

South Africa and Israel have The French have clearly demon- 

both made contributions to strated an ability to develop 

French R&D by financing nuclear power in an effort to 

major projects. Further- acquire a technical base for 

more, Israel has provided a nuclear weapons option. * - 1 



design modifications for the Thus exports have contributed to 

the fin 
frappe. 



French defense industry. * J the financing of the force de 



The policy of allowing French arms and reactors to be sold 
commercially has encouraged the defense industries to produce 
weapons and reactors for domestic use. For example, the 
French experience with nuclear submarine developments is 
similar to the experience of the US defense industry. Like 
the US, the French commercial reactors are derivative copies 
of the submarine reactor. In the US, both GE and Westinghouse 

were eager to capitalize commercially on their experience in 

T 1 9 1 • 5 8 1 
the US Navy's reactor program. ' J "Therefore, like the 

US, the establishing, maintenance and development of a strate- 
gic nuclear force... is expensive," and thus the future of the 

96 



French arms industry depends, to a large extent, on its 

. .. , [162:258] 
export potential. J 

The French have often employed the use of joint pro- 
duction of arms and nuclear fuel cycle technology in order 
to maximize export profits. This policy shows that commer- 
cial interests are often more compelling than long-standing 
hatreds or rivalries arising from war. The origin of coop- 
eration of this magnitude was the Shumann plan which enabled 
France and West Germany to pool resources of coal and steel 
to aid in post war economic recovery. The French cooperate 
to increase France's competitiveness as an arms and nuclear 
reactor supplier. 



Arms 

France has undertaken co- 
production of arms with 
West Germany, Britain, 
Italy, etc. Concorde, 
Transall, Jaguar, Martel, 
Alpha Jet, and Poland, to 
name a few, are all co- 

oroduced with the French 

, . . , . [162:258] 

defense industry. 



Nuclear Power 

France, West Germany and 
three other Common Market 
countries will pool re- 
sources for research, 
development, licensing 
and construction of liquid- 
sodium-cooled fast breeder 

^ [40:12] 

reactors . L J 



The French arms industry shares another pattern of export 
method with the nuclear power production industry. Both 
have profited by using the technique of exporting production 
technology under license, a technique not always used by 
other arms and reactor suppliers. This method has enabled 
the two industries to compete in spite of political and 
diplomatic pressures. 

97 



Arms 



Nuclear Power 



Although Giscard placed an 
errbargo on most military 
sales to South Africa two 
years ago, many of the arms 
are produced under earlier 
licensing agreements made 
earlier with the French. 
E.g., Mirage aircraft are 
built under license at a 



plant near Johannesburg. 



[107:46] 



French scientists have de- 
veloped a new process for 
nuclear fuel enrichment that 
does not produce weapons 
grade fuel. It allows the 
French to export "do-it- 
yourself" kits to countries 
that want to make their own 
reactor fuel without the 
danger of weapons prolifera- 
tion. To date only the 
French have envisioned the 
export of nuclear breeder 
reactors under license. L 



The two methods of transfer, co-production and licensing of 
production technology, have helped to make French arms and 
reactors competitive with the two superpowers. The French 
have demonstrated an ability to break the monopoly held by 
the two superpowers that had existed in both arms and nuclear 
reactor export markets. 



Arms 

The French arms technology 
of the 60' s was able to 
compete successfully with 
the US and USSR in almost 

every area of weapons de- 

. . [162:258] - 

velopment. Co- 

production of arms has 
contributed to "European . 
policy and to breaking the 
domination exercised by 



Nuclear Power 

The new French fuel process 
would break what amounts to 
a world monopoly of commer- 
cial uranium enrichment 

shared by the US and the 

_ . . ... [104:2] 
Soviet Union . L 

The French refused to 
support the formalized 
restraints on future exports 



98 



the US in provision of 
essential material. »t 162:258 ] 



of " sensitive materials " 
which was advocated by the 
US-led London Nuclear 

r 1 7 - 9 1 

Suppliers Conference . L * J 



Thus the French hold to their policy of exploiting the market 
formally dominated by the US and USSR. 

The most striking parallel pattern of arms and nuclear 
transfers can be seen in the events following the 1967 and 
1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The French were one of the principal 
suppliers of Israeli arms in the 60' s as well as the designer 
and builder of the Israeli research reactor at Dimona in 1964 . 
The parallel pattern emerged when the French decided to 
exchange the Israeli market for the potentially more lucrative 
Arab market, first with French arms transfers after the 1967 
war, and then with reactor orders after the 1973 war. 



Arms 

SIPRI explains that the 
reason for this shift in 
French Arms transfer poli- 
cy is "for commercial and 
other gains in an Arab 
world disenchanted with 
Britain and the US and not 
satisfied with USSR> 162:249 -' 
The Libyan Mirage deal for 
110 French fighters in 
January of 1970 is an ex- 
ample of the shift to Arab 

. . [162:252] 
markets . 



Nuclear Power 

This same pattern was re- 
peated for French-supplied 
nuclear reactors after the 
1973 war. The Iranian 
government became impatient 
waiting for American reactor 
orders and signed a contract 
with France for two 900- 

megawatt nuclear reactor 

. . 1Q __ [8:78, 53:5] 

plants in 1977. L J 



99 



These two examples illustrate the French policy of "all- 
azimuth friendship" with the Arab world. *- 117 : 76 ^ This 
policy was the result of a pragmatic evaluation of the 
benefits to be gained from courting the Arab market in lieu 
of what the Israelis could offer. The courtship of the Arabs 
with arms and reactors has proven to be far more profitable for 
the French industry than would have been the case with contin- 
uing trade with the Israelis. The French have patterned 
their "pro-Arab, sans Israeli" nuclear export policy after 
their significant arms policy shift following the 1967 war. 

French nuclear reactor sales and French arms sales 
are considered similar in the minds of some international 
actors. It is clear that at a meeting of the "nonaligned 
nations" at Colombo in August 1976, the delegates considered 
the French policy of arms and reactor exports to be similar. 
To wit: all the Arab oil countries voted for the resolution 
to "impose an immediate oil embargo on France (and Israel) in 

retribution for their arms sales and (French) reactor sales 

*. c *.t, a^ • ,,[117:62] 
to South Africa." 1 - J 

The French have adopted a policy io export nuclear 

reactors in a renewed effort to gain resources from the Third 

World, notably South Africa. This pattern originated with 

the French arms trade. For example: 

Arms Nuclear Power 

In South Africa, an agree- Diplomats in Paris say that 

ment concerning uranium was France ' s new wider interest 

signed in 1966, simultaneously in Africa stems from such 

with the signing of a general practical considerations as 

100 



arms trade agreement. Also, her need for petroleum and 

French uranium prospecting uranium. This reply came in 

is taking place in Brazil response to concern for 

which is associated with French supplied nuclear 

purchases of military plants in South Africa. * ■■ 
equiprent.t 1521256 ^ 

Therefore, it can be said that the French pattern has been to 
use arms transfers as well as nuclear reactor sales to secure 
foreign resources. The pattern is similar. Even the techniques 
by which foreign markets are secured by French arms merchants 
are similar to the methods used by the nuclear reactor industry. 
For example, close military cooperation between the French and 
the North African states paved the way for future arms purchases 
when these states reached a level of development compatible 
with large acquisitions of arms. " J This method of close 
cooperation worked for the French in Japan. A close associa- 
tion with the Japanese during the designing of the French- 
built $200 million plant at Tokai Mura paved the way for the 
signing of an accord between Paris and Tokyo in which it was 
agreed that Japan would have its used nuclear fuel reprocessed 
in a French installation. 1 - " - 1 It appears that this close 
nuclear reactor cooperation paved the way for the reprocessing 
contract in much the same way that the French military coop- 
eration policy in North Africa led to arms sales. Furthermore, 
President Carter, in commenting on the Franco-Japanese accord, 
has predicted that once Japan has shipped fuel to France for 
reprocessing, other countries will wish to get into the busi- 
ness of reprocessing spent fuel for export. Regardless 
of increasing availability of alternate sources, one can assume, 

101 



as evidenced by past French arms export policies, that France 
will be on hand to capitalize on the nations that follow 
Japan's example. 

The French have an arms transfer policy of providing 
services and training along with their equipment. This is 

intended to maintain French influence and to create a con- 

I" 1 fi 2 • 2 fi 2 1 
tinuing dependency on France. J This practice has 

been duplicated in the nuclear reprocessing contracts signed 

by the recipients of French and other suppliers' reactor 

equipment. The French procedure is to promote reprocessing 

for all nuclear generating plants in as many countries as it 

can convince to participate. Thus the need for French 

support is maintained through nuclear servicing in the same 

way it was maintained with weapons training and servicing. 

One reason the French are able to supply separate 

reprocessing services for nuclear reactors built by other 

suppliers is because of the diversified structuring of the 

nuclear power industry. Each function of the nuclear fuel 

cycle is marketed as a separate and complete package . This 

method was designed and perfected by the French arms industry 



Arms 

The French arms industry was 
designed with independent 
private selling agencies 

which undertake the promo- 

4.- ^ [162:255] 

tion of weapon exports. 1 - J 

Paris maintains an elaborate 

sales apparatus that has been 

organized into several 



Nuclear Power 

The French have designed 
their nuclear export products 
to be sold separately. 
Standard reactors, fuel pro- 
cessors, fast breeder re- 
actors, and fuel reprocessing 
in French plants, are all 
packaged and sold as separate 



102 



separate agencies, in 
order to avoid political 
problems in providing 
weapons to both sides of 
a conflict. Thus one 
French agency can sell 
arms to South Africa and 
Israel, while another can 
show the latest gadgetry 
to black Africans and 
ArabsJ 3:12 l 



export commodities. Thus, 
the sale of a fast breeder 
reactor to Iran to process 
fuel from US supplied plants 
or reprocessing Japanese fuel 
used in their home-built 
plants can be sold as complete 
transactions. 



The French have designed their nuclear export products to be 
sold separately. Thus the sale of a fast breeder to Iran can 
proceed as a complete transaction in the same pattern as 
earlier French arms transfer patterns. 

There is a striking similarity between the arguments 
used to defend the French position on the export of arms to 
South Africa during the Security Council debate in 196 3, and 
the defense of the French reactor sales to South Africa 
expressed by President Giscard d'Estaing. Each made the 
distinction between intended national use and the possibility 
that the arms' or reactors' fuel might be used for offensive 
purposes . 



Arms 

Security Council representa- 
tive Seydoux declared, "I 
have specified that the 
French authorities would 
take all the measures they 
consider necessary to 
prevent the sale to the 



Nuclear Power 

While admitting that two 
French-built submarines and 
frigates were still in the 
pipeline, the two nuclear re- 
actors which France had 
promised were designed to 
meet South Africa's power 



103 



South African government needs, not to boost its mili- 

of arms which could be used tary potential. ^ 

for repression" thus drawing 
the distinction between arms 
for national defense and arms 
for internal use. [l62:269] 

There is a common reference to symbolism in both the 
French arms transfer policies of the 60' s and the current 
reactor policies in the 70 's. In the first example, President 
de Gaulle announced that France would impose an embargo on the 
aggressor in the Middle East after the June war of 1967. This 
embargo was selective in that it continued to supply all equip- 
ment to Israel except the Mirage because the Mirage was "the 
symbol of the offensive and its role was very important in the 
development of the conflict. " L " - 1 In another instance, 
the 'symbol of conflict" was the French reactor sale to South 
Africa. Pressure was stepped up by the black Africans to get 
France to cancel its reactor contract as was stated in The 
Economist because "the contract was seen as a symbol of the 
old sin of placing commercial interests above the fate of 
the blacks. ^ 107:46 ^ 

The French have shown in the following two examples 
that for both arms transfer contracts and nuclear reactor 
contracts they are prepared to operate under two policies, 

the official policy and the policy of the industry to honor 

. [162:264] 
its commitments. 



104 



Arms 



Nuclear Power 



During the French embargo 
on the aggressor in the 
1967 war, the official 
policy condemned Israeli 
actions while the industry 

continued to supply 

[162:264] _. 
arms. L J Also, in 

January 1970, France 
stated that there would be 
no sale of Mirages to Iraq. 
However, Iraq has been re- 
ceiving French weapons in- 
cluding six Alouettes.'- 162:257 ^ 



Although agreeing to an em- 
bargo on future exports of 
nuclear reprocessing plants, 
the French have continued 
with delivery of the fast 
breeder reactor to Pakistan 
withholding only a portion 
of the equipment back at 
this time. The French have 
stated that they are bound 
bv the previous pledge to 
PakistarJ 105 ^ 



France has used the tactic of arms denial and reactor 
denial when the French have felt that the recipient had 
taken advantage of the transfer policies: 



Arms 

The selective arms embargo 
on Israel became a total 
embargo after Israeli 
sailors smuggled five gun- 
boats out of France in 1969. 
"The gunboat affair repre- 
sented a defiance of official 

rw. U t ,,[162:266] 
French policy 

When Israel defied the 

official policy, the second 

industry policy was 

. . [162:266] 

clamped down upon. 



Nuclear Power 

This same pattern developed 
when South Africa was sus- 
pected of developing an 
atomic bomb capability 
from the French supplied 
reactors. France became the 
most outspoken advocate of a 

complete arms embargo by the 

w 4- [52:3] 
West. 



It seems apparent that the French propensity to sell 
arms and reactors can be altered by the recipients themselves 

105 



faster than by diplomatic pressure on France by other supplier 
nations . 

The final comparison will be made between the transfer 
modes used for French arms and reactors exports. SIPRI states 
that there is little evidence that the French government sub- 
sidizes arms exports. 1 J Reactor sales are also con- 
ducted with cash or credit. The line of credit extended for 
reactors, however, far exceeds the amount available for arms 
purchases. One can assume that the French are reluctant to 
extend credit for the arms which in the case of Middle East 
sales could be used up before they were paid for. 

The nuclear power technology and equipment are assured 
of being long-term assets. What's more, the fuel supplies and 
reprocessing that will endure beyond the initial reactor sale 
is a form of leverage to guarantee payment. One may assume 
that the power and influence gained either through reactor 
sales or arms transfers are similar in their combined ability 
to accomplish certain foreign policy objectives sought by the 
supplier nation. This section has identified the cause of 
this influence and not attempted to measure its effect. It 
will be enough to serve the research design of this thesis to 
merely identify the similarities between the French arms 
transfer patterns and the nuclear power equipment sales. 
These will now be presented in summary. 

The preceding evidence has shown that French arms 
transfer policies and present day French nuclear power export 
policies have followed a parallel pattern. The following list 
will highlight the similarities of the two policies. 

106 



3 . Summarizing the Similarities 

1. Both policies demonstrate the French pattern of 
operating independently to maintain its image as 
a non-aligned actor. 

2. Each policy shows French willingness to deal with 
pariah states despite diplomatic pressures. 

3. Both policies have caused the US to attempt to 
prevent deliveries of certain equipment. 

4. Both industries are used by the French government 
in its policy to promote exports which cater to 
developing countries . 

5. In both industries exports are tailored to meet 
foreign market requirements. 

6 . Both policies illustrate the French style of 
taking advantages of opportunistic situations. 

7. Both policies seek the best available markets 
without strong political restraints. 

8. In both industries the government shares a large 
part of the ownership. 

9 . The government closely cooperates with both in- 
dustries and closely supervises each sale. 

10 . In both industries the government plays an active 
role in the initiation of export deals. 

11. Exports of both arms and nuclear technology are 
closely associated with the French defense industry 

12. Both export policies are designed to partially 

defray the large R&D expenses incurred by both 

industries . 

107 



13. Each policy encourages the defense industries to 
produce products for domestic use. 

14 . In both industries a policy of joint production 
has made French exports competitive. 

15. Both policies use the technique of exporting pro- 
duction technology under license to circumvent 
political and diplomatic pressures. 

16. Both policies have demonstrated the French ability 
to break the superpower monopoly. 

17. Both policies exhibited a pragmatic approach in 
their shift from Israeli to the more lucrative 
Arab markets . 

18. Both policies were used to signal the French 
political policy of "all-azimuth friendship," 
especially to the Arab world. 

19 . Both policies have been viewed as similar in the 
minds of some international actors. 

20. Both export policies have been used to gain re- 
sources from the Third World. 

21. Both policies have benefited from close coopera- 
tion with recipients after the transfers, paving 
the way for future sales. 

22. Both policies provide additional services intended 
to maintain French influence and a continuing 
dependency . 

23. Both industries feature diversified structuring to 
allow separate sales of each function. 



108 



24. Both policies are able to sell separate packages 
to a diversified market because of the compart- 
mentalized structure of each industry. 

25. Similar arguments are used to defend both policies. 

26. Common reference is made to symbolism in both the 
arms transfer policies of the 60' s and the nuclear 
export policies of the 70 's. 

27. For both arms transfer contracts and nuclear re- 
actor contracts the French have demonstrated that 
they are prepared to operate under two policies, 
the official policy and the policy of the industry 
to honor its commitments. 

28. Both policies have used the tactic of export em- 
bargo when the French felt the recipients had 
taken advantage of the transfer policies. 

29. Both policies are similar in the modes of transfer 
However, the line of credit extended for reactors 
far exceeds the amount extended for arms purchases . 

4 . Conclusion 

Increased arms exports and commercial activity could 
be regarded as part of a policy to increase the French polit- 
ical "presence" in the world, to establish France as an inter- 
national force in the world independent of the two major power 
camps.'- •* Indeed, French prestige has increased 
recently as a result of its ambitious nuclear export policy. 
The actual degree of influence and power gained as a direct 
result of the marketing of French nuclear power generating 

109 



equipment and service is difficult to measure and beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However this chapter has served to 
compare French nuclear export policies to the French arms 
transfer patterns. The evidence presented clearly supports 
the notion that the French have adapted their arms transfer 
policies to an ambitious nuclear reactor export program. The 
next section will continue to evaluate the impact of French 
nuclear power exports on the conduct of French foreign policy 



110 



C. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 

This section of this chapter will attempt to identify the 
major foreign policy goals of the French Government. These 
goals, stated simply, are to promote French wealth, influence, 
and culture both at home and abroad. After a more detailed 
identification of French foreign policy objectives, this 
paper will focus on the ability of the ambitious nuclear power 
industry to help the French government promote French wealth, 
influence and culture in both domestic and international pol- 
itics. The purpose of this examination is to illustrate the 
value of using a nuclear power-oriented approach in the polit- 
ical analysis of a nation. 

There are several reasons why one should link foreign 
policy with nuclear policy. To begin with, the intensive 
capital commitment to nuclear power production requires 
government involvement to deal with both foreign and domestic 
issues an order of magnitude greater than all other industries. 
The public and private debates over nuclear energy issues and 
options include the controversies surrounding the budget, 
defense, weapons proliferation, the environment, unemployment, 
technology transfers, trade deficits, ideological competition, 
energy scarcity and energy dependency, etc. 

Writing in the magazine, Nuclear Engineering International , 
Michel Pecqueur commented about the link between foreign policy 
and nuclear policy. "Today nuclear energy has grown up and is 

intimately blended in the technical, economic and political 

f i 36 • 45 "I 
issues of the life of the country." 1 - * J Although this 

111 



statement pertained specifically to France, the nuclear power 
industry has the characteristic of permeating the socio- 
political events in any country. Therefore, the link between 
the nuclear policy of a nation and a nation's foreign policy 
is valuable to the political analyst as a point where one can 
expect to find a concentration of several elements of public 
and private concern. The study of the nuclear power contro- 
versy becomes the place to take the political pulse of a 
nation, to observe, so to speak, the intensity and direction 
of current political thought. 

The formulation of nuclear policy in France is a highly 
visible process. One organization runs the whole nuclear 
industry. The Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique , or CEA, is 
responsible for controlling all nuclear activities from 
research to defense. One of the CEA ' s main responsibilities 
is to advise the French government on the formulation of nu- 
clear policy. According to Michel Pecqueur, Adjoint a 
1 ' Administrateur General Delegue du CEA: 

Nuclear activities are now increasingly part of many 
aspects of the daily life of the country, for ex- 
ample: technical studies; safety; industrial organ- 
ization; international relations; and national defence. 

Thus, the government and administration must daily 
deal with nuclear matters, or with problems where 
nuclear matters are involved. As an horizontal 
organization CEA is able to take a global view of 
all the relevant aspects, and to advise government 
and administration accordingly on the formulation 
and implementation of nuclear policy . L 136 : 45 -l 

Clearly, a relationship exists between the French political 
process that formulates foreign policy and the CEA nuclear 



112 



policy activities. This relationship can be explored by the 
analyst for the purpose of producing evidence to show that 
the French nuclear power industry represents major trends in 
French foreign policy. 

1 . Defining French Foreign Policy 

According to Dr. Dimitri Simes, Director of Soviet 
Policy Studies, Georgetown University, it is hard to define 
national objectives or specific foreign policy. "The country 
itself may not know what its policies are . " ^ -* The best 
source of foreign policy objectives must come from those 
public statements and policy papers which carry the indorse- 
ment of the Government. 

The following statements will serve to identify three 
main areas for French foreign policy objectives. They are 
extracted from a document entitled, France's Defense Policy, 
the Report on the Program for Military Expenditures and Equip - 
ment for the Armed Forces for the 1977-1982 Period , adopted 
by Parliament as Law No. 76-531 on June 19, 1976, hereafter 
referred to as the "Defense document." 



The world context for France's security policy 
is characterized by a few basic facts: first, 
that in East-West relations the quest for detente 
has replaced the cold war; second, the growing 
importance that the countries of the Third World, 
most of them the fruit of decolonization, have 
acquired in international relations; and lastly, 
the first signs, in the western part of our conti- 
nent, of the economic and political organization 
of Europe. L50:4J 



113 



It is possible to extract from this statement several 
key areas in which the French are involved. As a consequence 
of these concerns, certain roles emerge: the role of France 
as an independent international actor, the role of France as 
a guardian of the Third World's stability, and the role of 
France as an influence in the reorganization of Europe. 

2 . The Role of Independent International Actor 

In the role of independent international actor, France 
has demonstrated the willingness to commit troops and supplies 
to prevent a major actor from gaining control over a Third 
World country. In less than one year, President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing has committed French forces on five fronts 
in Africa and the Middle East. The justification given for 
some of this French activity is that France must fill the role 

abandoned by the United States since the Vietnam War and 

T 91 • 17dl 
prevent Soviet efforts at destabilization in Africa. 

The role of French intervention in post cold war in- 
ternational relations was explained by French Foreign Minister 
Louis de Guiringaud when he said: "It is probably the weaken- 
ing or the disappearance of a certain kind of American presence 
in the world today encouraged the Soviets to profit in these 
various situations of tension. ' - 1 The French, according to 
Guiringaud, are trying to help the Africans take control of 
their problems themselves. Some critics of Giscard, 
however, have charged that "Giscard sees himself as another 

De Gaulle — seeking to enhance the image of France as a major 

T 1 8 9 • 3 9 1 
power on the international scene." 1 ' J For whatever 

114 



reason, the first principle of French foreign policy is to 
reverse the trend towards the isolationism evidenced in the 
1960's and to project France into the main stream of inter- 
national relations. Much can be added to the understanding 
of French foreign policy by comparing France to another 
independent-minded nuclear power, China. 

One important parallel emerged from the visit to 
Shanghai Harbor in mid April 19 78 by a French destroyer. 
This event marked the first time a Western warship had 
visited China since the Communist revolution. On this 
occasion Chairman Hua Kuo-feng declared France and China 

r £ "7 • "7 "3 "I 

"a global united front against superpower hegemonism. " L " J 
This statement reflects the sentiments of a large number of 
Frenchmen who still treasure the memory of Charles de Gaulle. 
It serves as a clue to the direction in which French foreign 
policy is headed as France pursues its role as an agent of 
international change . 

Regardless of the reasons behind France's active 
participation in international politics, the future success 
of French foreign policy will be aided in large measure by 
the increasing success of the French nuclear power industry 
abroad. This will be seen in the second area of French 
concern identified by the Defense document — the importance 
of the Third World, and the role of French intervention. 

3 . Guardian of Third World Stability 

Today the Third World nations, says the Defense docu- 
ment: 

115 



...constitute an essential factor in the con- 
temporary world due to the importance they 
have acquired on the international scene. L 50:5 J 



Mr. Georges Puravet, Industrial Attache of the French- 
Commercial Consulate, when interviewed in San Francisco stated 
that concern for the Third World has always been a major ob- 
jective of French foreign policy. France was protected by the 
markets and resources that her colonies provided until the 
decolonization of the 1960 's. France was suddenly forced to 
revise her export policies and begin exporting for survival. 
Today, exports account for 14-15% of the French GNP compared 
to roughly seven percent for the US. ^ French foreign 
policy must, therefore, ensure the continuing stability and 
independence of the Third World both as a market for French 
products, and as the major source of raw materials that 
support the French economy. 

One objective of French foreign policy is to maintain 
a position of trust and influence in African affairs . The 
French have long maintained an intensive web of cultural, 
economic and occasionally military relationships with their 
former colonies as well as several other African states. 
For example, during the recent crisis in Zaire, the French 
assumed Western leadership but with a style that avoided the 
appearance of colonial intervention. While Legionnaires 
policed several African states, the heads of some 20 African 
nations converged in Paris for the fifth annual Franco- 
African summit. Time magazine reported that "The hero of the 
hour was President Giscard, who was broadly cheered when he 



116 



declared, 'Africa for the Africans. Everything must be done 

to withdraw the continent from the rivalries of political 

T 3 3 • 2 8 1 
blocs.'" 1 - * J The basic element of French foreign policy 

towards the Third World is to maintain this "good neighbor" 

image while advancing the interests of the French. 

The reason for direct involvement in the Third World 
is the long-held French view that the economic destinies of 
Europe and Africa are inextricably linked. Europe lacks ade- 
quate resources to survive, and Africa is the obvious source. 
The goal of French foreign policy is to take whatever action 
is necessary to maintain African stability and independence. 
Supplying nuclear energy is one strategy which will assist 
Third World development free from superpower influence. 

The Defense document helps to explain additional 
reasons for the French commitment to Third World development 
and stability : 

These states must also be taken into account 
because of the wealth some of them have 
acquired through their share of the world's 
resources of raw materials and energy, and 
the influence they can now exercise at both 
the regional and international levels . L 50 : 5 J 

The reference to raw materials held by Third World nations 
draws attention to another reason given for the growing French 
military presence in Africa. Stated simply, the French troops 

help protect France's interest in raw materials, including 

[2*59] 
copper in Zaire and uranium in Chad. Thus, Africa 

serves France serves the Africans, and both French foreign 

policy and nuclear export policy is likely to reflect this 

relationship. 

117 



Another aspect of French foreign policy towards the 
Third World is evident in this continuation of the Defense 
document : 



Lastly, these states have to face tremendous 
problems which, for many of them, are addi- 
tional factors of internal instability and 
external vulnerability. They include eco- 
nomic underdevelopment, inadequate food 
supplies and energy and technological 
dependence .[50:5] 



The Defense statement identifies the problems which 
France must try to solve to insure Third World stability. 
One aim of the massive restructuring of the French nuclear 
power industry after the 1974 oil embargo was to enable the 
French to provide the Third World with a measure of energy 
independence. The role of France as a major provider of the 
world's future energy needs is implied by the following 
statement by Jean-Claude Leny, managing director of the 
nuclear reactor construction firm, Framatome : 

Following extensive structural changes, the in- 
dustry has achieved a production rate five times 
greater than before. We now have every reason 
to believe that it has the stability and capa- 
bility to face its national responsibilities and 
an active part in the development of nuclear 
energy for peaceful use the world over . L 9 / : ^0 J 

Whereas the aim of the French foreign policy towards the Third 
World is to provide for their energy independence, additional 
benefits are derived from the ability of nuclear technology to 
aid economic development and trade. Time magazine has pointed 
out that the French are almost surely correct in believing 
that economic development will solve Africa's problem of 

118 



external influences. They quote a French official as saying, 
"There will never be stability in a world that includes both 
Stone Age people and nuclear powers. Our African strategy is 
one of well-being. We're convinced Africans would rather eat 
than die." L " J Because France is building its nuclear 
power industry with the expressed intention of supplying the 
Third World with its energy needs, the nuclear power industry 
helps to promote the basic element of French foreign policy.. 
Third World stability. 

The Defense document continues to outline the role of 
French foreign policy towards Africa and the Middle East: 



The evolution of the Third World concerns France's 
security in more than one respect. Our country, 
now that it has become one of the top trading 
powers in the world, is obliged to give special 
attention to the conditions governing the cost 
and regular delivery of its supplies from abroad, 
for they govern to a large extent our own economic 
health. [50:5-6] 



Through this statement one can discern the goal of French 
foreign policy to become the "key commercial intermediary 

between Europe and the developing countries of Africa and the 

[49 . 5 1 
Middle East." L ' J According to the vision of the future 

projected by French economic planners in a special report by 

The Journal of Commerce , France envisions its role as the 

[49 . 5 "I 
"Entrepot for Europe." * This report has stated that: 



France is ideally suited to assume the role as 
the main channel for trade and investment flows 
between Europe and the Third World because it 
has historic ties with former colonies that are 
now major producers of scarce raw materials 
and, more significantly, because its coastlines, 
harbors and river systems provide easy access to 
Europe's industrial heart. 

119 



A striking example of the kind of deals France 
is seeking with Third World countries is the 
agreement under which France will sell Iran 
five, 1 , 000-megawatt nuclear reactors worth 
$1.1 billion in exchange for increased 
Iranian oil deliveries to France . l49 : 5 J 



To make sure that France is ready to fill its projec- 
ted role as a producer and an entrepot, the government is 
concentrating its development efforts on the creation of new 
industrial zones and ports along the Atlantic and Mediterranean 
coastlines. Clearly then, the role of intermediary between 
Europe and the Third World is a major aspect of French foreign 
policy. The summation of this policy is contained in the 
following statement from the Defense document: 



France has chosen to make the most of her inter- 
national position, which is unique in many 
regards, and to practice a policy of overture, 
dialogue and cooperation. She wants to help 
the states of the Third World that are the 
closest to her, both historically and geo- 
graphically, to strengthen their independence 
and secure their development. France is aware 
of the current importance of North-South rela- 
tions and she intends to help search for and 
define a more just, more rational and more 
stable new economic order. [50: 6] 



4 . Influencing the Reorganization of Europe 

The third area of concern identified by the Defense 
document for French involvement casts France as an architect 
in the redesigning of pan-European relations. The Defense 
statement calls attention to the "...profound solidarity that 

has established cultural economic and political ties among 

„ [ 5 : 6 1 
the nations of Western Europe. 



120 



Interdependence is formed and strengthened each day 
by geographic proximity, easy communications, booming trade 
and an ever-expanding field of cooperation. Solidarity is 
reflected "in Western Europe's growing awareness of its 
common interests, of the unity of its cultural heritage that 
underlies the diversity of national expressions, of the wealth 
and strength of its material and human potential . " ^ 50 : 6 -■ 

This solidarity is behind the spirit of enterprise 

...that has given life and form to the grand 
design of European unity for more than a 
quarter of a century now. Despite alternating 
phases of progress and consolidation this spirit 
has already made concrete achievements . [50 : 6 ] 

An example of concrete achievement is the joint planning and 
construction of major European nuclear energy projects for 
the mutual benefits of all participating European states. 
This is a clear indication of how the French nuclear power 
industry has contributed to the "grand design of European 
union . " 

More important than the French desire to remain inde- 
pendent from superpower influence is the pragmatic realization 
that Western Europe must somehow remain outside the same 
superpower influence. Therefore, France's foreign policy 
interests are served not only by influencing the economic 
development of Western Europe but also by ensuring that no 
other international actor can impose its own foreign policy 
restraints on Western Europe as well. The nuclear power in- 
dustry, with its fuel cycle capabilities, gives France the 
means to exert a measure of influence in Western European 

121 



affairs and to reduce the hold over Europe by other energy 
suppliers. The following excerpt from the Rand Report, 
"Europe's Changing Energy Relations," bears this out: 

(The) security of supply of nuclear raw 
material has been an important factor in 
Western European thinking precisely vis-a-vis 
the United States, with the principal accent 
on possible economic rather than political 
conflicts. Since the 1960's, the French, 
the Germans, and others have feared that, 
without alternatives to the U.S. monopoly of 
enrichment services, the development of their 
nuclear power and nuclear equipment industries 
would be stifled by insufficient and capricious 
supplies of enriched uranium; that the monopoly 
would be used to favor both U.S. utilities and 
the U.S. nuclear equipment industry that is 
competing with the Europeans for exports; and 
that to continue relying on U.S. services would 
too drastically magnify Europe's economic, 
technological, and political subordination to 
the United States. Consequently, at the begin- 
ning of the 19 70s, the groundwork was laid for 
the development of alternative enrichment fa- 
cilities . [11 7 : 39 ] 

Economic influence over Western Europe is a major 
factor in French foreign policy. Towards this specific end, 
the ambitious nuclear power program is allowing France to 
take a leading role in meeting the energy needs of Europe. 
For example, France is less dependent on foreign uranium 
resources than it has been on oil imports. Proven domestic 
reserves of economic-grade ores amount to approximately 
5 percent of proven world reserves in this category. These 
should meet the whole of French requirements until 19 85 or 
1990 according to Jean-Paul Silve , in his article for the 
Nuclear Engineering International entitled, "Fuel cycle industry 

,_-, ■ „ .,[154 :55] 

combines private and public Enterprise. 

122 



These uranium reserves give France an advantage over 
other Western European nations in the field of energy inde- 
pendence. Furthermore, the technological and industrial 
advances made by the French nuclear power industry give the 
French a commanding lead in several areas of nuclear power 
production. Taking into account the energy situation of 
France during the oil crisis, a vast nuclear energy program 
was launched on sound technological and economic bases. This 
considerable effort, which will reduce French dependence on 
imported energy, has resulted in Framatome becoming one of 
the world's leading reactor builders. Additionally, in the 
fuel cycle field, France has been able to ensure access to 
substantial uranium reserves and the promotion and construc- 
tion on its own territory of the first large European enrich- 
ment facility. Finally, France has at its disposal the first 

operational facility for reprocessing irradiated fuel working 

4.1, i^ [136:47] 
in the world . 

Everything taken into account, the French nuclear 
power industry has created a favorable condition for the 
French to influence and build a united European community. 
This community would exist free from superpower or petro-power 
energy dependence largely due to the French nuclear industrial 
strength. 

At the end of 1975, Framatome started operating at 
Chalon-sur-Saone , the largest nuclear component production 
plant in Europe. Framatome and its affiliates have invested 
nearly Fr 1000 million in the French nuclear industry. This 
figure, according to Mr. Silve, gives an idea of the industrial 

123 



risk involved and of the effort made to enter the nuclear 

, . [154:56] 
market. J 

Another indication of the enormous commitment to 
nuclear power is the role of the French industrial effort in 
reshaping Europe's economy. Jean-Paul Silve points to the 
large enrichment plant in the south of France now under con- 
struction by Eurodif, the participants in which include 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Iran. The purpose of this plant 
is not only to provide a substantial portion of the French 
requirements for enriched uranium after 1979, but to combine 
with other projects under study (for example fast breeder 

technology) with a view to complete European nuclear fuel 

s±. i no - [154 : 56 1 
independence after 19 84. J 

French foreign policy towards European unity has 
already been served by the nuclear power industry. Georges 
Venryes , CEA's chief of nuclear industrial applications, 
points this out in an article about international cooperation 
to benefit the development of advanced reactors. He states 
that the French reactor designs meant to benefit commercial 
interests " . . .neverless do not induce us to monopolize the 
benefits for ourselves alone, and to close the door to 
others." 1 Venryes says that France demonstrated this 

clearly in 1974 when a complete set of agreements were con- 
cluded by Italy and France, closely associating the two 
countries in all aspects of the future development of fast 
breeder reactors. " According to Venryes: 



124 



The same spirit led to the Franco-German 
agreements which were signed in preliminary 
form in May 1976, and which set the stage 
for very close cooperation between France 
and Germany with respect to research and 
development and engineering work, as well as 
industrial activities. Germany is also 
associated with Belgium and Holland in these 
areas . 

Thus a pattern is emerging, throughout Europe, 
of a gradual concentration of efforts and re- 
sources. It is to be hoped that it will con- 
tinue to spread, because it constitutes a major 
guarantee of effectiveness and success for the 
future of fast neutron plants . [178 : 64 ] 

Thus nuclear power has followed the pattern of pan-European 
cooperation which can be interpreted as an element of French 
foreign policy. 

5 . Paris as a World Metropolis 

Along these same lines, the Journal of Commerce re- 
ported in 1974 that: 

The new administration of President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing would like to see Paris 
become an "international capital" as the 
favored site for European regional head- 
quarters, for Europe-wide financial insti- 
tutions, and for industrial research and 
development centers . [49 : 11 J 

Therefore, the current thrust of French development 

is the "internationalization of the economy, with Paris 

("49 -Hi 
serving as the new international capital." 1 - " J The brand 

new Charles de Gaulle Airport located in Roissy, France is 

listed as one of the pillars of the French government's plans 

to make France a leading international gateway for the nine- 

[49 • 13 1 
nation European Economic Community. * Locating the major 

125 



X 



source of Europe's future nuclear fuel production and enrich- 
ment service in France also serves to make Paris a dominant 
economic Mecca. Thus the French nuclear power industry aids 
this goal of French foreign policy. 

Beyond the ambition to make France the central source 
of pan-European economic and political power lies the goal of 
French foreign policy to expand the private industrial sector 
to global proportions. The goal is to make French industrial 
strength operate wherever and however possible throughout the 
globe. According to Michel Pecqueur, the nuclear power in- 
dustry is a prime example of this principle in action. "Owing 
to its strong position in the fuel cycle market, CEA can ensure, 
with the participation of private French industry, adequate 

fuel supplies for national needs and keep free a substantial 

4. 4.. i * 4. ,,[136:47] 

potential for export. 

"French industrial companies," says Michel Pecqueur, 
"must develop their industrial and commercial activities in 
France and abroad. Whether through shares or licenses, 
these activities are reinforced by the considerable backing 
of CEA.^ 136:47 ' 

The French government agreed with this claim that the 
role of nuclear power can be used to bolster French industry 
in the private sector with the view of extending French in- 
dustry overseas. In August 19 75 CEA received the government's 
authorization to combine its fuel cycle activities into a 
private subsidiary. The new company was known as Cogema with 
100 percent government ownership despite its private legal 



126 



status. By December of 19 76 Cogema held an impressive 
potential in the field of the nuclear fuel cycle: domestic 
mines, uranium reserves, shares in overseas mining ventures, 
isotopic separation and reprocessing facilities. All this 
was achieved in close relationship with the rest of private 
industry . 

In addition to the far-reaching worldwide nuclear 
fuel cycle industry, the French foreign policy objectives 
are benefiting from the nuclear reactor plants built and 
exported by Framatome . According to Jean-Claude Leny: 



Framatome can play a larger part in export 
contracts than in home contracts and the 
range of plants for export extends from 600 
to 1300 MWe (megawatts) . For the supply of 
complete turnkey nuclear power plants to 
other countries, a special organization is 
set up in each case. A consortium is estab- 
lished led by Framatome as manufacturer of 
the nuclear island and including one company 
responsible for civil engineering, and 
Framaleg, a Framatome subsidiary which is 
in charge of general contracting and contract 
management. A joint EdF (Electricite de 
France) /Framatome subsidiary currently being 
formed, will be in charge of technical co- 
ordination of the whole plant . [97 : 55 ] 



Thus one sees the major role played by the advanced reactor 
technology segment of the nuclear power industry in advancing 
the cause of international industrial expansion. Advanced 
reactor technology has given France a considerable lead over 
other suppliers of the world's demand for nuclear generated 
electricity. The broad-based industrial program mates per- 
fectly with French nuclear export policies. For example, 
the French are encouraged to export whole nuclear complexes 

127 



or only the individual components depending on the needs of 
the recipient. Furthermore, the foreign export licensing 
policies allow components and equipment to be manufactured by 
companies in the client countries, if it is technically and 
economically feasible. It might be argued that the French 
international industrial expansion policy can be measured by 
the progress of French-supplied nuclear commerce. 

Another foreign policy benefit of the French nuclear 
industry is the international cooperation surrounding the 
specialized transportation of nuclear components and fuel. 
The CEA, for example, has its own transportation facilities 
but the major proportion of transportation requirements 
throughout the various stages of the fuel cycle are handled 
by Transnucleaire , a company affiliated with several other 
companies in other countries including the UK, Germany, and 
the U.S. The specialized equipment, worldwide experience 
and network of connections enable Transnucleaire to handle 

every type of worldwide transportation operation for a wide 

[154:57] 
variety of prospective customers. 

The Defense document identified three main areas 
where French foreign policy plans to operate. The first 
casts France as an international actor in the new era of 
detente. The second area makes French foreign policy respon- 
sible for the stability of the Third World. The last area 
recognizes the opportunity for France to promote pan-European 
cooperation and to project French industrial, economic and 
hence political power throughout the world from an inter- 
national capital in Paris. 

128 



Each of the identified areas of French foreign policy 
are served by the burgeoning nuclear power industry and 
commerce. One reason the nuclear industry has this capacity 
stems from the similarity of purpose of French foreign policy 
and French nuclear policy as they pertain to exports. 
Jacques Sornein, director of general management in Cogema, 
explains the policy of one of the many segments of the nuclear 
power industry, the fuel cycle company: 

The policy is to offer integrated services 
covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle, in- 
cluding fuel management, and to develop an 
active exporting policy in this field. This 
approach has been adopted because Cogema 's 
own industrial capacity plus that which it 
has access to largely outstrips French re- 
quirements. Also the company at present 
holds a strong position in the key areas 
of uranium mining, enrichment, and repro- 
cessing which gives it advantages over its 
international competitors . It also owns 
and manages various and diversified means 
of transportation for radioactive materials 
that can meet a vast range of clients ' re- 
quirements . [156 : 5 7-5 8 ] 

In other words, the nuclear industry has the capacity to 
produce more than it can use at home. Therefore, the nuclear 
industry is equipped with the means by which it hopes to 
corner as much as it can of the world's nuclear power require- 
ments. It is easy to see why the French nuclear power indus- 
try has adopted a policy that matches the aspirations of the 
French foreign policy. Although the two policies are similar 
in purpose and intent, the objective of this section has been 
to show that French government has actually used the commer- 
cially exploitative nature of the nuclear power industry to 

enhance the foreign policy of the French nation. 

129 



This section has served to identify some of the major 
goals of French foreign policy as it exists today. The next 
section will present the role of nuclear policy in contempo- 
rary domestic politics. The ability of the nuclear industry 
to reflect French domestic political trends will be examined 
to determine whether or not nuclear power analysis can achieve 
the same results of determining national domestic policy as 
it seems to have done for the foreign policy of France. 

D. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS 

The last chapter identified several of the goals of French 
foreign policy. In order to understand the role of nuclear 
power policy in the French political system it will be neces- 
sary to define the relationship between French foreign policy 
and contemporary domestic politics. Foreign policy must un- 
dergo considerable public and private debate before it is 
adopted. According to Professor Milorad Drachkovitch, the 

French are more interested in the processes and procedures 

[202] 
for the agenda than for the final vote. 

Major and minor political figures play an active role in 
the formulation of French foreign policy. In the process of 
challenging or defending foreign policy options, these actors 
help to articulate and reflect the goals and aspirations of 
the French people. Popular support is sought for individual 
programs as part of the legislative process in a style remi- 
niscent of De Gaulle when he appealed directly to the people 
to overcome parliamentary opposition. Therefore, French 

130 



foreign policy cannot be assessed without an understanding of 
the important role it plays in the hands of the skilled poli- 
tician. 

1 . Public Debate 

Public debate forces the government to deal with both 
national and international forces while formulating its foreign 
policy. Despite the volatile nature of French domestic poli- 
tics, the final product of foreign policy is one of the clearest 
and most determined in the world, enabling France to exist as 
a major actor outside of superpower influence. Jesse W. Lewis, 
Jr., writing about France has said: 

"En the broad area of foreign and defense policy 
France is taken seriously and has credibility 
both because it is a nuclear power — the only 
acknowledged one in the Mediterranean — and 
because it has sufficient domestic cohesiveness 
to see its policies through . " [101 : 111 J 

The purpose of this section is to go beyond an exami- 
nation of the ability of nuclear power to enhance a country's 
foreign policy. Evidence will be presented to show how the 
nuclear power industry is used to serve not only foreign but 
domestic goals. 

One of the key issues in the March 1973 elections was 
the French economy. Each of the major candidates promised 
ambitious programs for industrial reform, designed to cure 
the stagnation, inflation, and unemployment, and to regain 
the confidence of large investors, consumers and wage-earners 
alike. A key element in Giscard's campaign promise was the 

131 



ambitious nuclear power program, promising to free the country 
from 70 percent of its imported energy requirement by 1985. 
Of all the candidates, only Socialist party chief, Francois 
Mitterrand decided to challenge the government's policy. 
Mitterrand sought to attract the French anti-nuclear lobby 
after 30,000 protestors staged a noisy demonstration at 
Super Phenix, the big French plutonium breeder reactor east 
of Lyon in August, 1977. Mitterrand's pre-election campaign 
speeches attacked the government's policy of headlong nuclear 

expansion as reckless, "launched like a railroad engine at 

[ 1 44 . 22l 
400 kilometers an hour." L " J Auberjonois reported the 

government's strategy in his article entitled, "Giscard Visiting 

Atomic Site:" 



To deal with domestic opposition, the French 
Government has sought to either sidestep the 
debate or steal the thunder of critics with 
timely public gestures. 

Only a day before the rally against the re- 
actor site in Creys-Malville , President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing chose to visit a 
nearby uranium-enrichment plant and assert 
his commitment to nuclear programs . [10 =10 J 



2 . The Role of Nuclear Power Analysis 

Mitterrand's party failed in the election. The major 
reason given for this failure was the inability of Mitterrand's 
Socialists and Georges Marchais ' French Communist Party to 
maintain the Union of the Left throughout the election. One 
of the subjects of disagreement between the Socialists and 
Communists was nuclear energy policy for France. While 
Mitterrand was courting the ecologists and advocating a 

132 



referendum on the government's ambitious nuclear energy 
policy, the French Communist Party was supporting the all- 
out program of the State. This disagreement mirrored the 
many differences of opinion that characterized the defeat 
of the Union of the Left. Therefore, one can argue that 
nuclear power analysis could be used to uncover and highlight 
domestic political trends. 

A second benefit of using a nuclear power approach 
to analyze domestic politics is its ability to predict the 
amount of popular support generated by a party platform 
during an election. For example, the anti-nuclear debate 
prompted by Mitterrand's attacks on Giscard d'Estaing's 
nuclear program was also a challenge to the basic principles 
of the government's program for economic recovery. By using 
nuclear power analysis, one can look beyond the publicly de- 
bated issues of nuclear energy to determine whether or not 
the government's program would enjoy popular support. For 
example, Mitterrand was calling for a referendum on the 
government's nuclear energy policy. Political observers 
covering this campaign, believed that such a referendum would 
in fact show that a majority of the people would favor a nu- 
clear program. " "There is no alternative." wrote the 
newspaper, Le Figaro , about the Socialists anti-nuclear 
campaign, "The choice of nuclear energy is logical and un- 
avoidable." 1 - ' J Most Frenchmen, concerned about rising 
unemployment, would probably favor the nuclear power industry 
with its beneficial effects on the French economy since the 
impact of the nuclear industry exceeded by far the narrow 

133 



circle of heavy component manufacturers. Many other indus- 
tries are involved, producing valves, fittings, auxiliary 
piping, electrical generating equipment and controls. Con- 
ventional occupations are involved with designing and building 
the hardware and software, site preparation, research, mining, 
financing and transportation. In other words, the government 
decisions to exercise its nuclear option had a snowball effect 
on the economy . 

It is difficult to assess the effect that Mitterrand's 
campaign to halt the French nuclear industry had on the elec- 
tions. It is significant, however, that the new Minister of 
Industry, appointed by Giscard, following the center-right's 
stunning electoral victory was Andre Giraud who has been chief 
of France's Atomic Energy Commission since 1970. This appoint- 
ment was one of only five new cabinet positions filled by 
Giscard specifically to keep a campaign promise that his cabi- 
net "would contain some new faces who would symbolize the need 

T 2 9 • 32 1 
for social reform in France." 1 ' J It is obvious that 

Giscard' s choice of the man behind France's nuclear program 

to head the Ministry of Industry indicates that both the 

president and his new chief of industry will be behind France's 

nuclear energy policy. Thus the nuclear power industry has 

served to identify the new administration's decision to pursue 

its ambitious industrial reorganization; a move that reflects 

a current trend of French domestic politics. Under Giscard' s 

leadership France projects its foreign policy roles as an 

agent of international change, as defender of the Third World's 

independence, and as a European power. All three roles were 

134 



played out when French troops "rescued" the Europeans trapped 
by the invasion of Zaire. Newsweek says that "Giscard 1 s show 
of power abroad improved his political position at home. His 
popularity increased after his first big overseas operation — 
the French airlift of 1,500 Moroccan troops to defeat an 
earlier rebel attack on Zaire in April 1977. "L 2:59 J During 
the current Zaire crisis President Giscard achieved domestic 
popularity at the fifth annual Franco-African summit with his 
"Africa for the Africans" speech which prompted Gabon's 
president, the current head of the Organization of African 
Unity, to declare that Giscard deserved the Nobel Prize for 
his African policy. " J The popularity demonstrated for 
the President's aggressive African policies emphasizes the 
role of foreign policy in the French political process. 

The nuclear power industry serves the French politi- 
cian by providing an overseas involvement which demonstrates 
to the French constituency the successful role of France as 
an independent international actor. For example, when 
Giscard refused to back down under pressure from Washington 
on a proposed sale of a French fast-breeder reactor to 
Pakistan, he demonstrated a familiar brand of French toughness 
reminiscent of De Gaulle. The political implications of this 
were not missed by the U.S. press corps. A New York Times 
article stated: 



The United States is aware that the issue has 
considerable domestic political importance in 
France and that it would hurt President Giscard 
d'Estaing if there were the slightest indication-go . Afi -i 
that he had yielded to pressure from Washington. J 



135 



3 . Conclusion 

France sees herself today as a "leader among peers" 
in the European Common Market. Despite the bilateral struggle 
for Europe between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, France is trying 
to restore the prestige and bargaining power it once enjoyed 
as a nineteenth century superpower. "Super-nationalism" is a 
value shared by the average Frenchman. The very existence of 
the great diversity of political goals among the French, the 
coalition strategy which this diversity of goals and multi- 
party system imposes, and most importantly, the French self- 
image as a major political actor force prospective political 
leaders to exceed their domestic political role to gain 
support. 

Most comparative political scientists narrow their de- 
scription of political systems to the processes that exist 
within the national framework, thus ignoring the international 
aspects of the French experience. The nuclear power industry 
can help to transcend this arbitrary national boundary to help 
explain the extra-parliamentary role played by French candi- 
dates to increase popular support. 

As demonstrated previously in this chapter, the nuclear 
power industry has made great inroads in establishing France as 
an influence in Third World countries. It also offers excellent 
opportunities for advancing France's position as an economic and 
commercial world leader. It has been made clear that because 
the nuclear power industry serves French foreign policy objec- 
tives, it can be used in the hands of astute politicians to 



136 



increase their popular support and political influence. It 
is also clear that future French political debates will help 
determine the role that the nuclear power industry will play 
in French foreign policy. One must conclude, therefore, that 
the nuclear power industry is both a source and an indicator 
of French foreign policy. 



137 



IV. CONCLUSION 

International relations are becoming increasingly complex. 
Worldwide information and communication and the search for 
natural resources have drawn remote areas and primitive 
peoples into the concern of the mainstream of international 
policy . 

Foreign aid and military arms transfers of a decade ago 
are becoming passe. Middle Eastern nations now rival the mil- 
itary power, influence and wealth of their former European 
benefactors. Although it was once clear which country was 
the benefactor in an arms transfer agreement, this distinction 
faded recently when the Shah of Iran was encouraged by the U.S. 
to buy the sophisticated F-14 weapons system in order to help 
the American manufacturer out of financial difficulties. 

Along with the changing political picture in the world is 
the ever-increasing unification of national economies under a 
worldwide economic standard. The European currency now being 
discussed is one example of this change. The effect this 
change has had on national economies is to expand the decision- 
making process of national monetary decisions, once the exclu- 
sive domain of congress and parliaments, to include state 
department and foreign ministry financial advisors, and in 
some cases, foreign governments. 

Recent technological developments in weaponry, e.g.; the 
neutron bomb, tactical nuclear artillery shells, etc., threaten 

138 



to increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will be 
settled by military means. The proliferation of fast-breeder 
reactors has increased the complexity of international relations 
by increasing the danger that terrorists could acquire the 
weapons grade fuel and use it for nuclear blackmail. 

Conflicts are resolved short of military interaction by 
several alternative means involving economic and political 
interaction on many different levels. Often these solutions 
affect a wide range of international actors. For example, 
nations invoke oil embargos, suspend aid, extend credit, cancel 
contracts, or submit to public debate in attempting to influence 
an outcome short of a military show of strength. Often economic 
solutions circumvent established treaties and organizations. As 
a result of the complex interaction networks, foreign policy 
decision-makers require rapidly acquired, accurate assessments 
of changing events in order to formulate effective foreign 
policy. Each decision must be assessed before it is implemented 
for its possible consequences in as many spheres as can possi- 
bly be predicted. In all cases, however, the political analyst 
is charged with the task of monitoring international relations . 
The use of a nuclear-oriented approach has been demonstrated in 
global, continental and national perspectives. The global 
perspective uncovered nuclear-related international networks 
that are operating irrespective of national policy or inter- 
national regulatory control. The existence of these networks 
and the methods they employ to cope with energy scarcity 
correspond to similar economic trends experienced in a variety 
of multinational industries and corporations: cooperative 

139 



aerospace technology, shared computer systems, joint develop- 
ment and production of defense systems, pharmaceutical research 
and development by independent companies, to name a few. Each 
of these apolitical, economically-oriented networks exhibits 
evidence of being affected by international trends of coopera- 
tion and conflict, and consequently reflects changing political 
and economic developments. However, no single network can 
equal the network involving nuclear power for its ability to 
comprehensively reflect not only international trends of eco- 
nomic and political development, but also scientific, environ- 
mental, sociological, financial, military, industrial and 
energy developments . 

The continental perspective highlighted areas of inter- 
national cooperation and conflict present in the unification 
and industrial expansion of Western Europe. The continental 
perspective also focused on the ability of the nuclear power 
industry to chart the trend toward the reconciliation of the 
economic and political differences that historically have 
separated Eastern and Western Europe. Furthermore, the con- 
tinental perspective of nuclear power analysis provided a 
device to measure the success or failure of economic re- 
approachment between certain industrial nations of Eastern 
Europe and those of the European Economic Community. 

Finally, this thesis focused the nuclear power analysis 
on France. French nuclear power export policy exists today 
as the cutting edge of French foreign policy. As it inherited 
the legacy of the French arms transfer policy, it presents the 



140 



political analyst with several historic parallels by which to 
compare the scope and direction of French foreign policy with 
its scope and direction a decade ago. Furthermore, French 
nuclear power export policy exists as a microcosmic copy of 
French economic policy, designed to curb unemployment and 
satisfy the demands of the heavy industrial sector. Therefore, 
by charting the progress of the nuclear power industry's ex- 
pansion at home and abroad, the analyst is provided with the 
means of studying French domestic and foreign policies. 

The nuclear power analysis will require all three perspec- 
tives, global, continental and national, working in concert to 
achieve a comprehensive picture of the political, economic and 
military trends in international relations. One can envision 
a computer network analyzing data from events, testing pre- 
programmed hypotheses and constantly scanning interaction maps 
similar to the five-step methodology suggested in Section D of 
Chapter I. In such a system one could expect trends to appear. 
These trends could be monitored for their closing rate towards 
other trends calculated to be on collision courses. Current 
air traffic control computer technology provides this service 
for aircraft. The warning, "Conflict Alert," is signaled both 
on the controller's scope and in each cockpit of the endangered 
aircraft. Cockpit displays signal a recommended escape di- 
rection, up or down, right or left, corresponding with an 
opposite direction given in the other aircraft. Pilots are 
trained to react immediately to these directions, suspending 
judgment until the conflict is resolved. Supposedly, each 
pilot is secure in the knowledge that his action is not made 

141 



unilaterally, but in compliance with an independent safety- 
oriented computer, equipped to account for the overall 
traffic situation. 

With enough imagination one might envision an international 
trend analysis computer similar in design to the German auto- 
motive computer that is being tested for automobile traffic 
control in major German cities. The dashboard display picks 
up inputs from magnetic strips in the city streets, utilizing 
data from a central traffic control computer. Each car is 
individually directed down side streets and alternate traffic 
routes to avoid major traffic jams when they occur. 

The possibility of this technology being used for foreign 
policy decision-making is not that remote. By categorizing 
nuclear-related events (i.e., Brazil buys a reactor from 
West Germany) and linking these events to a decision matrix 
involving global, continental, national and regional political, 
economic and military networks, one might graphically illustrate 
the possible ancillary consequences of choosing one alternative 
over another. Previously overlooked repercussions could be 
avoided. International partners could be forewarned and antici- 
pated rival reactions could be circumvented. Congressional 
debate generated by executive programs in areas such as 
proposed arms transfers might be shortened by running the pro- 
posals through comprehensive computer trend analysis. The 
possibilities are limitless. 

This thesis has suggested that nuclear energy, with its 
far ranging effects on international economics and society, is 
one logical choice for comprehensive international political 

142 



analysis. Other approaches, or combinations of analytical 
frameworks based on other industries or other global phenomena 
may prove more productive. However, this thesis has served 
its purpose by suggesting that, regardless of the indicators 
used, political analysis must and can keep pace with the 
rapidly changing, ever more complex nature of international 
relations . 



143 



APPENDIX 



(as of June 1, 1977; 



(195) 



COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 

The countries listed below are participant* to the Nuclear Non-Proliieratioa treaty: 



Afghanistan 

Australia 

Austria 

The Bahama* 

Belgium 

Benin 

Bolivia 

Botswana 

Bulgaria 

Burundi 

Cambodia 

Cameroon 

Canada 

Central African Republic 

Chad 

China, Republic of 

Coata Rica 

Cyprus 

Czechoslovakia 

Denmark 

Dominican Republic 

Ecuador 

El Salvador 

Ethiopia 

Fiji 

Finland 

Gabon 

Gambia, The 

German Democratic Republic 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Ghana 

Greece 

Grenada 

Guatemala 

Haiti 

Holy See 

Honduras 

Hungary 

Ireland 

Iran 

Iraq 

Ireland 

Italy 

Ivory Coast 

Jamaica 

Japan 

Jordan 

Kenya 

Korea, Republic of 

Lao* 

Lebanon 



Lesotho 

Liberia 

Libya 

Luxembourg 

Malagasy Republic 

Malaysia 

Maldive Islands 

Mali 

Malta 

Mauritius 

Mexico 

Mongolia 

Morocco 

Nepal 

Netherlands 

New Zealand 

Nicaragua 

Nigeria, Federation of 

Norway 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Philippines 

Poland 

Romania 

Rwanda 

San Marino 

Senegal 

Sierra Leon* 

Singapore 

Somalia 

Sudan 

Surinam 

Swaziland 
Sweden 

Switzerland 

Syrian Arab Republic 

Thailand 

Togo 

Tonga 

Tunisia 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

United Kingdom 

United State* 

Upper Volts 

Uruguay 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 

Western Samoa 

Yugoslavia 

Zaire 



SOURCE: General Electric Company internal information, 
provided during interview. 



Copy 



144 



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151. "Senate Approves Stricter Limits on Nuclear Exports," 
Monterey Peninsula Herald , February 8, 1978. 

152. "Senate is Twisting Arms on Korea," The New York Times , 
Sec. 4, p. 2, February 26, 1978. 

15 3. "Senate Unit is Divided on Terms of Nuclear Reactor Sale 

to Israel," The New York Times , June 20, 1977. 

154. Silve, Jean-Paul, "Fuel cycle industry combines private 
and public enterprises," Nuclear Engineering International , 
pp. 55-57, December 1976. 

155. "Some Conflicts of High Policy," The New York Times , 
p. D2, April 17, 1977. 

156. Sornein, Jacques, "New fuel cycle company operates world- 
wide," Nuclear Engineering International , pp. 57-60, 
December 1976 . 

157. "South Africa and the Bomb: Yes or No?" The New York 
T ime s , August 28, 19 77. 

158. Spanier, John, Games Nations Play , NY: Praeger, 1975. 

159. "Spain in Midst of Nuclear Power Buildup, Worries About 
U.S. Curbs," The New York Times , April 14, 1977. 

160. Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations , NY: St. Martin's Press, 326 pp., 
1977. 

161. Spurgeon, M. Keeny, Jr., Nuclear Power Issues and Choices , 
Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Sponsored 
by the Ford Foundation, Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing 
Co. , 365 pp. , 1977. 

162. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The 
Arms Trade with the Third World , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1971. 

16 3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Armaments 

and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age , Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 308 pp., 1976. 



154 



164. Sulzberger, C. L . , "Can the Genie Be Put Back in the 
Bottle?" The New York Times , p. E19, May 15, 1977. 

165. Sulzberger, C. L., "Playing Nuclear Games at the Summit," 
The New York Times , May 7, 1977. 

166. "Syria's Quest," Newsweek , p. 18, April 3, 1978. 

16 7. Teltsch, Kathleen, "3 Western Powers Veto Moves in U.N. 

to Curb South Africa," The New York Times , November 1, 1977. 

168. Thiriet, Lucien, L'Energie Nucleaire , Paris: Bordas , Dunod, 
Gauthier-Villars, 1976. 

169. "Thorium Backed as Plutonium Alternative," The New York 
Times , April 13, 1977. 

170. "To Breed or Not to Breed — Plutonium Is the Question," 
The Economist , pp. 22-23, October 15, 1977. 

171. Tocqueville, Alexis de , The Old Regime and the French 
Revolution , NY: Doubleday & Co . , Inc., 1955. 

172. Trumbull, Robert, "Canada Is Expected to Resume Sending 
Uranium to Europe," The New York Times , July 13, 1977. 

173. Tuzo, General Sir Harry, "Allied Command Europe," RUSI 
Journal , p. 1, September 1977 (London). 

174. Ullman, Richard H., "Trilateralism: 'Partnership' for 
What?" Foreign Affairs , pp. 1-19, October 1976. 

175. "The Uranium Cartel's Fallout," Time , November 21, 1977. 

176. "Uranium's a Gamble," The Economist , December 17, 1977. 

177. "The Use of Nuclear Power Condemned by Salzburg 'Counter- 
conference,'" The New York Times , May 2, 1977. 

178. Venryes , Georges, "International cooperation will benefit 
the development of advanced reactors," Nuclear Engineering 
International , pp. 60-64, December 1976. 

179. "Views on Energy Solutions Differ in Various Nations," 
The New York Times , p. 47, May 17, 19 77. 

180. Villaros, Pierre, "Joint company sells nuclear experience 
overseas," Nuclear Engineering International , pp. 64-65, 
December 1976 . 

181. Vinccur, John, "Outlook Held Bleak for Manufacturers of 
Atomic Reactors," The New York Times , pp. A-l , D-6 , 
September 20, 1977. 



155 



182. "Visit from a Rude Emperor," T ime , p. 19, July 4, 1977. 

183. Wagner, Philip, "Eurocommunism," Washington Post Service, 
Monterey Peninsula Herald , p. 3, col. 2, August 9, 1977. 

184. Weeger, Xavier, "Comments on French Nuclear Policy," 
Le Monde , (Paris), August 6, 1977. 

185. "West Sees an Aid Cut as No Bar to Growth," The New York 
Times , p. D5, October 7, 1977. 

186. "West German Economy Alters as Plants Go Abroad," The 
New York Times , March 9, 19 77. 

187. Wicker, Tom, "More Nuclear Debate: II," The New York 
Times , November 11, 1977. 

188. Woods, Michael, "Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing System Devised," 
Monterey Peninsula Herald , March 7, 19 78. 

189. "Worldgram From the Capitals of the World," U.S. News & 
World Report , p. 39, May 22, 1978. 

190. "World Oil Shortage Is Called Inevitable," The New York 
Times , pp. A-l, 47, May 16, 1977. 

191. Yergin, Daniel, "The Terrifying Prospect: Atomic Bombs 
Everywhere," The Atlantic Monthly , pp. 47-65, April 1977. 

192. "Young Opposes Ban on Nuclear Fuel to S.Africa," Monterey 
Peninsula Herald , October 31, 1977. 

19 3. "Yugoslavia and Nuclear Weapons," Interview with Col. -Gen. 
Kukol , March 13, 1977, Survival , p. 127, September/October 
1977. 

194. "ZBIG's Optimism in a Hostile World," Time, p. 18, August 8, 
1977. 



PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 



195. Mr. Adrian Fioretti, Marketing Procedures, The General 
Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Operations Division, 
San Jose, California, May 4, 1978. 

196. Mr. Georges Puravet, Attache Industriel, Le Conseiller 
Commercial de France, Consulat General de France, San 
Francisco, California, May 5, 1978. 



156 



TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS 

197. Mr. Peter Cartwright, Light Water Reactors, The General 
Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Operations, San Jose, 
California, April 26, 1978. 

198. Mr. Ken Beecher, Public Relations, The General Electric 
Company, Fast Breeder/Diffusion Reactor Divison, Sunnyvale, 
California, April 26, 1978. 

199. Mr. Ben Bromberg, Fast Breeder Reactors, The General 
Electric Company, Sunnyvale, California, April 24 and 26, 197 J 

200. Mr. Bert Wolf, Foreign Markets, The General Electric 
Company, San Jose, California, April 24, 1978. 

LECTURE SOURCES 

Lectures to students at the Naval Postgraduate School 
during seminars in Soviet-European Affairs, Monterey, 
California . 

201. Professor Vernon Aspaturian, "Eastern Europe in World 
Perspective," February 27, 1978. 

202. Dr. Milorad M. Drachkovitch , Senior Fellow, the Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University, "France Before the 
Elections: Public Mood and Political Games," March 6, 
1978. 

203. Professor Steven Garret, "Yugovlavia and the West," 
February 21, 19 78. 

204. Professor Kenneth Jowett, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact," 
February 13, 19 78. 

20 5. Dr. Dimitri Simes, "Eurocommunism and NATO," February 3, 
1978. 

ADDITIONAL LECTURE SOURCES 

206. Dr. Ray S. Cline, Executive Director of Studies , The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown 
University, at the AIAA Strategic Systems Conference, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 3, 
1978. 

MESSAGES AND REPORTS 

207. FBIS — WEU — 76 — 186, Thursday, September 23, 1976, Vol. VII, 
No. 186 (Barre announces changes in Government's Fiscal 
Policy) , p. PK 2. 

208. FBIS — WEU — 76 — 239, Tuesday, December 13, 1977, Vol. VII, 
No. 239, Annex No. 43 (Commissioner discusses Canadian 
uranium deliveries) , p. B 1. 

157 



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158 



Thesis 180827 

L773 Lloyd 

c.l The role of the 

nuclear power Issue 
in the analysis of 
contemporary inter- 
national relations. 



thesL773 

The role of the nuclear power issue in t 




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